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THE SIT-INS AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
Christopher W. Schmidt*
ABSTRACT
By taking their seats at “whites only” lunch counters across the South in the spring
of 1960, African American students not only launched a dramatic new stage in the
civil rights movement, they also sparked a national reconsideration of the scope of
the constitutional equal protection requirement.  The critical constitutional question
raised by the sit-in movement was whether the Fourteenth Amendment, which after
Brown v. Board of Education1 prohibited racial segregation in schools and other state-
operated facilities, applied to privately owned accommodations open to the general
public.  From the perspective of the student protesters, the lunch counter operators,
and most of the American public, the question of whether the nondiscriminatory logic
of Brown should apply to public accommodations involved a consideration of the role
of public accommodations in social life, the dignitary costs of exclusion, and the values
served by the protection of private choice and associational rights within the com-
mercial sphere.  From the perspective of lawyers, judges, and lawmakers, the relevant
question centered on a doctrinal issue that had been under considerable pressure in the
two decades preceding the sit-ins: the “state action” requirement of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  At the time of the sit-ins, many assumed that resolution of the issue
demanded a reconsideration of the state action doctrine.  Yet, when given the oppor-
tunity, neither the Supreme Court, in a series of cases arising from the sit-in protests,
nor Congress, in framing the public accommodations provision of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, took this path.  As a matter of official constitutional interpretation, the
state action doctrine survived the civil rights movement, modified somewhat but retain-
ing the same basic form it had when the Court first defined it in the late nineteenth
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2 On the student sit-in movement of 1960, see generally WILLIAM H. CHAFE, CIVILITIES
AND CIVIL RIGHTS: GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, AND THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR
FREEDOM 98–141 (1980); MARTIN OPPENHEIMER, THE SIT-IN MOVEMENT OF 1960 (1989)
(reprint of Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1963); HARVARD SITKOFF, THE
century.  In this Article, I explain why the sit-in movement, which proved remarkably
successful at changing attitudes, practices, and statutes, ultimately failed to change
constitutional law.  My analysis of the resilience of the state action doctrine draws
on recent scholarship on extrajudicial constitutionalism, even as it challenges some
of the premises that underlie this scholarship.
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INTRODUCTION
When African American students sat down at segregated lunch counters across the
South in the spring of 1960, they presented a profound challenge to the custom and
law of white supremacy.  It would be hard to imagine a form of protest that more
powerfully demonstrated the flagrant and perverse injustice of the Jim Crow South.
Here were well dressed students carrying schoolbooks and Bibles, quietly seated at
lunch counters—many located in department stores that welcomed black customers
to purchase anything in the store, including food, as long as they did not take a seat in
the restaurant—and all they were asking for was a cup of coffee.  The moral lines of
this scene were only sharpened when the demonstrations attracted audiences of angry
white youths shouting epithets at the unmoved protesters, spitting at them, dumping
food and drinks on their heads, throwing them to the ground, and beating them.2
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STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EQUALITY, 1954–1992, at 61–87 (rev. ed. 1993); MILES WOLFF, LUNCH
AT THE FIVE AND TEN: THE GREENSBORO SIT-INS (1970); Daniel H. Pollitt, Dime Store
Demonstrations: Events and Legal Problems of First Sixty Days, 1960 DUKE L.J. 315, 317–37.
3 See, e.g., JAMES H. LAUE, DIRECT ACTION AND DESEGREGATION, 1960–1962: TOWARD
A THEORY OF THE RATIONALIZATION OF PROTEST 91–95 (1989) (reprint of Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University, 1968); SITKOFF, supra note 2, at 79–81; Pollitt, supra note 2, at 319–22;
THE SOUTH: A Universal Effort, TIME, May 2, 1960, at 14.
4 See OPPENHEIMER, supra note 2, at 179; Pollitt, supra note 2, at 322–23.
5 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
6 347 U.S. 483.
7 See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(per curiam) (parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 950 (1956) (per curium) (buses); Holmes
v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf courses); Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public beaches); Muir
v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954) (per curiam) (public auditoriums).
For an examination of the background of these cases, see Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity
and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1, 51,
60–73 (1979).
The sit-ins were surely one of the most successful episodes of civil disobedience
in modern American history.  As the protests spread, shutting down restaurants, send-
ing hundreds of students to jail, and sparking sympathy boycotts in the North, they
forced the nation to pay attention.  With heroic simplicity, the protests made obvious
the injustice of discrimination in public accommodations and put to rest lingering
assumptions that African Americans in the South were satisfied with the existing
system of race relations or with token reforms.  They stirred a national outpouring of
support for the basic cause of equal access to public accommodations.3  In response
to the protests, local businesses voluntarily desegregated and hundreds of cities and
many states passed public accommodations statutes.4  And, in an event that even the
most idealistic civil rights advocate in 1960 would scarcely have thought possible,
in the face of a rapidly expanding protest movement in Birmingham and across the
South, Congress passed Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,5 prohibiting racial
discrimination in nearly all places of public service.
The dramatic accomplishments of the sit-in movement had unmistakable implica-
tions for the ways in which Americans understood the meaning of their Constitution.
The national debate stirred by the students’ challenge to exclusion from public accom-
modations, taking place in the midst of the struggle to come to terms with the
Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown v. Board
of Education,6 treated the issue as a constitutional dilemma.  By 1960, the Court,
through a series of per curiam decisions that extended Brown beyond schools, had
made clear that the constitutional nondiscrimination requirement prohibited segre-
gation of state-operated facilities.7  The sit-in protests pressed upon the nation, with
an urgency and sincerity of purpose that could not be captured in a traditional legal
challenge, the question of whether Brown’s equality mandate applied to privately-
owned facilities that opened their doors to the general public.  The controversy
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8 See infra Part I.A.
9 See infra Part I.C.
surrounding the sit-ins was pervasively engaged with the Constitution, as all sides
claimed to be acting in accordance with constitutional values.8  And the eventual
successes of the sit-ins, many concluded, provided the basis for a new understanding
of the constitutional equality principle, one that undermined legalistic distinctions
between official and private actors and gave greater recognition to the centrality of
human dignity in the struggle for racial equality.  The sit-ins exemplified the ways
in which a social movement could effectively transform popular understandings of
the Constitution.
Despite their achievement in reframing the nature of public accommodations and
the responsibility of government to ensure nondiscriminatory access, the sit-ins failed
to accomplish what many commentators, scholars, and public officials assumed was
their logical constitutional consequence: reframing, as a matter of positive consti-
tutional law, the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.  When given the opportunity,
neither the Supreme Court nor Congress translated the emergent popular understand-
ing of the reach of constitutional equality principles into an officially sanctioned re-
interpretation of the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause.  The sit-ins were one of
the most generative social protest events of modern American history, sparking a new
and remarkably effective stage of the modern black freedom struggle, contributing
to changes in the law and customs relating to public accommodations discrimination
that were nothing short of revolutionary.  They left little mark, however, on the area
of constitutional law they seemed destined to reshape.
The constitutional issue at the heart of the sit-ins was the “state action” require-
ment of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The state action
doctrine limits the amendment’s application to state actors, thereby excluding actions
of private individuals.  Historically, this doctrine has proven particularly responsive
to extra-judicial attitudes toward the permissible scope of federal power, the appro-
priate line between public responsibility and private choice, and basic ideas of justice.
The solidification of the doctrine in the late nineteenth century was of a piece with
the national abandonment of Reconstruction, just as the gradual undermining of the
traditional contours of the state action doctrine in the 1940s and 1950s was largely a
product of the rising tide of the civil rights movement.9  For this reason, the resilience
of the state action doctrine in the early 1960s is striking: the sit-ins (and subsequent
civil rights protests) achieved such transformative success in re-centering public con-
ceptions of the reach of national equality norms into the private commercial sphere, yet
they did relatively little to revise official interpretations of the state action requirement.
This Article describes the challenge to the state action doctrine during the height
of the civil rights movement.  It does so by focusing on two critical episodes—one
in the Supreme Court, the other in Congress.  In the years following the sit-ins, the
Supreme Court Justices evaluated a series of appeals deriving from prosecutions of
sit-in protesters.  The sit-in cases were the great aberration of the Warren Court.  At
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10 For the Supreme Court to apply the constitutional antidiscrimination norm to public
accommodations would not necessarily require a major overhaul of existing doctrine and it
would not have been a dramatic departure from the ambitious course the Warren Court was
already charting in the area of civil rights. It certainly would be nothing so doctrinally and
institutionally innovative as the school desegregation or reapportionment decisions. Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 83 (1954). By late 1963, deciding the sit-in cases on constitutional grounds would not have
been nearly as controversial as, say, the Court’s 1962 ruling striking down school prayer.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS 187–90 (2000) (describing the reaction to Engel). Similar comparisons
might be made between the sit-in cases and the Warren Court’s transformative rulings, in
response to the needs of the civil rights movement, in the areas of criminal procedure, free
speech, and federal courts. See, e.g., id. at 235, 412–44 passim, 307–10 (discussing various
Warren Court rulings).
11 See infra Part II.B.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
15 See infra Part II.B.
a time when the Justices confidently reworked one constitutional doctrine after
another, often in response to the moral challenges of the civil rights movement and
often in the face of considerable public resistance, they broke pattern in these cases.10
Between 1961 and 1963, the Court found ways to side with the students, overturning
trespassing and breach-of-peace convictions on narrow, fact-based grounds, while
avoiding the looming constitutional issue.11  But in the fall of 1963, when another
minimalist opinion appeared impossible, a majority of the Court, led by Justice Hugo
Black, was prepared to explicitly reject the students’ constitutional claim and hold
that the Constitution did not require racially equal access to public accommodations
(despite the fact that at this point federal public accommodations legislation appeared
unlikely to pass).12  This outcome was only averted when, in the spring of 1964, with
the Senate poised to finally overcome a Southern filibuster and pass the landmark
Civil Rights Act, Justice Black’s majority dissolved.13  A fractured Court issued what
was, in effect, another narrow opinion, with no majority to resolve the state action
issue one way or the other.14
The Supreme Court’s unwillingness to revise the state action doctrine in the sit-
in cases derived from two factors.  First, the doctrinal difficulties and institutional
concerns inherent in expanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s application
clearly played a limiting function in the sit-in cases.  This was particularly evident
among those Justices who appeared most willing to decide in favor of the students
on their constitutional claim.15  Yet the critical motivating factor for Justice Black did
not appear to be the doctrinal necessity of the state action limitation.  Rather, he was
moved by a broader, more systemic concern: the threat of civil disobedience to the
legal system.  For Justice Black, and likely some of his allies in the sit-in cases, grow-
ing anxiety with the possibility of extra-legal social protest as a viable pathway to
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16 See infra Part II.C.
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006).
18 See infra Parts III.B. and III.C.
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (relying on the Commerce Clause power of Congress for juris-
diction in regulating business).
20 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964); Heart of Atlanta v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964).
21 See infra Part III.E.
constitutional reinterpretation, as much as concern with doctrinal complexities, ulti-
mately limited his support for reconsidering the state action doctrine.  Ironically, then,
it was the very success of the sit-ins and the waves of direct action demonstrations
they inspired as a social protest movement that led at least some of the Justices to rally
around the traditional state action doctrine.  Thus, concerns with protecting the rule
of law in the face of a society that seemed pulled in increasingly lawless directions
played a central role in preventing the doctrinal shift that many assumed the Court was
destined to make.16
The other key episode in the story of the sit-ins and the state action doctrine took
place in Congress.  With considerable guidance from the Kennedy administration, civil
rights supporters in Congress began in 1963 to press for a federal public accommoda-
tions law—eventually codified as Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.17  In attempt-
ing to locate the appropriate source of congressional power to pass such a law, they too
debated the consequences of reconsidering the state action limitation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  And they too considered not only doctrinal complexities, but more
systemic concerns, particularly Congress’s relation to the Court in matters of consti-
tutional interpretation.  Although early in the deliberations over Title II advocates were
divided over whether the law should be based on the congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce or the Fourteenth Amendment, the Commerce Clause justification
ultimately won out as the primary basis for the legislation.18  Congress framed the legis-
lation so that its coverage derived largely from the relationship of hotels and restaurants
to interstate commerce, with congressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment relegated to a supplementary role.19  The Supreme Court upheld Title II
on these grounds, refusing to evaluate the alternative Fourteenth Amendment rationale,
to which most of the Justices felt Congress had not committed itself.20
The failure of congressional proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment route
demonstrates the considerable difficulties involved in congressional assertions of
constitutional interpretive authority on matters of individual rights, even at a moment
in history that appeared particularly auspicious for such a development.  There was
a supportive Supreme Court that was actually looking for Congress to act on the
public accommodations issue, there were strong majorities for the legislation in both
houses of Congress, and the American people widely recognized nondiscriminatory
access to public accommodations as a problem of constitutional dimension and the
general cause of the civil rights movement as both morally just and socially urgent.21
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22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Compare, for example, the scholarship on the Montgomery Bus Boycotts. This topic
has earned three lengthy legal-historical articles. Christopher Coleman, Laurence D. Nee &
Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Social Movements and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the
Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 663 (2005); Robert Jerome Glennon, The
Role of Law in the Civil Rights Movement: The Montgomery Bus Boycott, 1955–1957, 9 LAW
& HIST. REV. 59 (1991); Randall Kennedy, Martin Luther King’s Constitution: A Legal History
of the Montgomery Bus Boycott, 98 YALE L.J. 999 (1989). These are in addition to countless
historical accounts in monographs and biographies of Martin Luther King, Jr. Another com-
parable protest movement from the early civil rights era, the Freedom Rides, has recently
received an exhaustive historical account. RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (2006).
The sit-ins, which raised much more fundamental legal and constitutional questions than
either the Montgomery Bus Boycotts or the Freedom Rides, have received remarkably little
attention from legal scholars since the 1960s. Most studies of the legal issues raised by the
sit-ins appeared contemporaneously with the civil rights movement. LAUE, supra note 3;
OPPENHEIMER, supra note 2; HOWARD ZINN, SNCC: THE NEW ABOLITIONISTS (1964); Martin
Oppenheimer, The Southern Student Movement: Year I, 33 J. NEGRO EDUC. 396, 397 (1964);
Pollitt, supra note 2. Scholarship on the Supreme Court’s consideration of the sit-in cases also
peaked in the 1960s. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 31–41 (1968); Joel B. Grossman, A Model for
Judicial Policy Analysis: The Supreme Court and the Sit-In Cases, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL
RESEARCH 405 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969); Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Problem of the Compatibility of Civil Disobedience with American Institutions of Government,
43 TEX. L. REV. 492 (1965); Jack Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil
Dissonance, 77 YALE L.J. 1520 (1968); Thomas P. Lewis, The Sit-In Cases: Great
Expectations, 1963 SUP. CT. REV. 101; Burke Marshall, The Protest Movement and the Law,
51 VA. L. REV. 785 (1965); Monrad G. Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases of 1964: “But Answer Came
There None,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 137; John Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of
the “State Action” Limit on the Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966).
Since the 1960s, several accounts of the internal dynamics of the Court in the sit-in cases have
been published. Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90
MICH. L. REV. 213, 291–95 (1991); Brad Ervin, Note, Result or Reason: The Supreme Court
But even under these promising circumstances, congressional efforts to independently
interpret the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment remained tentative and limited.
Political and strategic concerns hindered a full weighing of the merits of the options.22
And, most importantly, in its deliberation on Title II, Congress never fully accepted
a position as a coequal branch on matters of constitutional interpretation.23  Neither the
legislators nor the Justice Department officials who advised them ever escaped from
deferential analyses of judicial precedent and prognostications of what the Supreme
Court was likely to do.
This Article has several goals.  First, I address some surprising gaps in the his-
torical scholarship.  For such a significant event in constitutional history, studies of
the sit-ins have been surprisingly limited, failing to explore at much length the legal
issues the protests raised.24  The history of Title II and the constitutional debates
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and the Sit-In Cases, 93 VA. L. REV. 181 (2007); McKenzie Webster, Note, The Warren
Court’s Struggle With the Sit-In Cases and the Constitutionality of Segregation in Places of
Public Accommodations, 17 J.L. & POL. 373 (2001). Historians who have written on the sit-
ins have largely ignored the constitutional ramifications of the protests, focusing instead on
local studies, see, e.g., CHAFE, supra note 2, at 79–101; DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN
(1998); and movement organization and mobilization studies, see, e.g., CLAYBORNE CARSON,
IN STRUGGLE: SNCC AND THE BLACK AWAKENING OF THE 1960S, at 9–18 (1981); ALDON D.
MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING
FOR CHANGE 188–215 (1984).
25 The best account of the constitutional debate over Title II is found in DONALD G.
MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY 292–330 (1966).
26 See, e.g., HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONAL POLICY, 1960–1972, at 79–81, 87–93 (1990); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel,
Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel,
110 YALE L.J. 441, 494–99 (2000). But see Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Dialogue and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1095 (2005) (examining the framing of Title II
at some length).
27 See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 83–87, 94–99; Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R.
Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on the 1964
Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417 (2003). General histories of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 include: DANIEL M. BERMAN, A BILL BECOMES A LAW: CONGRESS
ENACTS CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION (2d ed. 1966); NICK KOTZ, JUDGMENT DAYS: LYNDON
BAINES JOHNSON, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., AND THE LAWS THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2005);
ROBERT D. LOEVY, TO END ALL SEGREGATION: THE POLITICS OF THE PASSAGE OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1990); ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON,
HUBERT HUMPHREY, RICHARD RUSSELL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS (1996);
CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
28 “[B]oth judicial supremacy and popular constitutionalism each contribute indispensable
benefits to the American constitutional polity. They are in fact dialectically interconnected
surrounding its passage similarly lacks comprehensive analysis.  Much of the best
scholarship on Title II and the Fourteenth Amendment was written in the 1960s,25 and
more recent considerations of the constitutional debate behind Title II have been rela-
tively brief.26  The most thorough analyses of the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights
Act center on passage of Title VII, the employment discrimination provision, a far
more active provision today than Title II.27
Second, I seek to write constitutional history in a way that draws on the analytical
tools that have emerged from recent scholarship on the Constitution “outside the
Courts.”  One of the most valuable insights offered by studies of extrajudicial con-
stitutionalism has been the emphasis on the ways in which constitutional meaning
emerges from the interaction of groups and institutions situated in distinct social con-
texts and responding to different institutional responsibilities—between, for example,
courts and political branches, lawyers and movement activists.  It is in these points
of intersection that we can see the crucial moments of recognition, the flow of alter-
native constitutional norms between society and its courts (and back again), the recon-
ciliation of the formal language of the law and evolving social norms (and vice versa).28
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and have long coexisted.” Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Depart-
mentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1029 (2004) (footnote omitted).
Other works within the large and growing literature on popular constitutional understanding,
social movements, and the courts that I have found particularly useful include: LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS (1988); Jack M.
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
927 (2006); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577 (1993);
Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” 74
J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution:
Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006); Reva B. Siegel, Text in Context: Gender and the Constitution from
a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
The sit-in movement offers a rich case study to explore these dynamics of constitu-
tional development.  Here was an event, initiated with minimal strategic planning and
with little intention of making a claim of constitutional reconstruction, that sparked
a debate on the scope of the constitutional equal protection principle that took place
in the streets, in the courts, and in Congress.
Yet the ultimate failure, both in the Court and in Congress, of those who argued
that the confrontation with private racial discrimination required a reconsideration
of the state action limitation also offers a case study in the limitations of extrajudicial
constitutionalism.  Consequently, my examination of the sit-ins and the state action
doctrine both draws on and critiques scholarship on constitutional development out-
side the courts.  In practice, the dialogue between judicial and nonjudicial actors that
is at the heart of a robust constitutional system can prove difficult to achieve, even
when the relevant parties are in basic agreement on the policy outcome.  The sit-in
protesters relied on a method to express their disapproval of Jim Crow public accom-
modations—civil disobedience—that, while effective as a tactic of social protest, alien-
ated certain Justices on the Court.  Meanwhile, in Congress, those who framed the
federal public accommodations law chose, for reasons both institutional and political,
to accept judicial precedent as controlling, even when a majority of the Court was
willing to recognize congressional authority to redefine, independently from the Court,
the boundaries of the state action doctrine.  The fate of the constitutional claims that
emerged from the sit-ins demonstrates the challenges of creating alternative interpre-
tations of the Constitution outside the courts that not only respond to the political
and ideological needs of the extrajudicial actors but also offer a compelling case that
can move the courts.  The difficulty of balancing these divergent goals was a critical
reason for the resilience of the state action doctrine during the civil rights movement.
This Article proceeds in three main sections.  Part I focuses on the achievements
of the sit-in movement on the level of popular constitutionalism.  This Section ex-
plores the effect of the sit-ins on discussions taking place outside the courts on the
moral, legal, and constitutional status of racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions; the responsiveness of the state action doctrine to evolving social norms; and
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29 See WOLFF, supra note 2, at 11–12.
30 See, e.g., id. at 31–39.
31 See, e.g., Pollitt, supra note 2, at 317–19.
32 David Halberstam, “A Good City Gone Ugly,” REPORTER (Nashville, Tenn.), Mar. 31,
1960, reprinted in 1 REPORTING CIVIL RIGHTS: AMERICAN JOURNALISM 1941–1963, at 441
(2003).
33 Claude Sitton, Negro Criticizes N.A.A.C.P. Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1960, at 32.
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the relationship between Brown and the sit-ins.  Parts II and III examine efforts to
extend this constitutional dialogue by pressing the claims that had proved so powerful
in the realm of popular constitutionalism back upon official government institutions.
Part II explores the Supreme Court’s treatment of the sit-in cases and the ultimate un-
willingness of a majority of the Justices to accept the constitutional claim of the sit-
in protesters.  Part III looks at the debate over whether the Fourteenth Amendment
supplies congressional authority to pass a public accommodations law.  In my con-
clusion I consider the consequences of this history for state action and Section 5
jurisprudence, and, more generally, for the value and limitations of a dialogic model
of constitutional development.
I. THE SIT-INS AS A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
The students who launched the sit-in movement, beginning with the four
Greensboro A&T freshmen who sat down at a downtown Woolworth’s on February 1,
1960,29 were not concerned with the doctrinal complexities of the state action doc-
trine.  Indeed, they did not see themselves as making a constitutional claim—at least
not one that required judicial recognition.  In fact, the motivations for the first gen-
eration of sit-in protesters in the spring of 1960 pointed in the exact opposite direction:
they wanted to stake a claim for equal treatment and respect that would not have to be
settled in the courtroom.30  They feared that once their protests were turned into a
formal legal claim, they would lose control over the direction of the protests to the
lawyers, and the very point of the protest—which concerned the opportunity to enact
their dignitary claim, not just petition for its recognition—would be compromised.31
When the students discussed their motivations for participating in the sit-ins,
they talked remarkably little about the courts as a forum for positive change.  James
Lawson, the fearless, uncompromising leader of the Nashville movement, attacked
the civil rights establishment: “The legal redress, the civil-rights redress, are far too
slow for the demands of the time.  The sit-in is a break with the accepted tradition
of change, of legislation and the courts.”32  Lawson derided the NAACP as “a fund-
raising agency, a legal agency” that had “by and large neglected the major resource
that we have—a disciplined, free people who would be able to work unanimously to
implement the ideals of justice and freedom.”33  “None of the [student] leaders I spoke
to were interested in test cases,” Michael Walzer reported in an influential account
of the opening months of the movement.34  “That the legal work of the NAACP was
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important, everyone agreed; but this, I was told over and over again, was more impor-
tant.”35  The very identity of the first wave of sit-in protesters formed in opposition to
court-focused approaches to civil rights.
Intentions of the first generation of student protesters notwithstanding, the lunch
counter protests quickly came to be understood as having a constitutional dimension,
to be evaluated both inside and outside the courts.  Defenders of segregation refer-
enced the constitutional distinction between public facilities (such as schools) and
privately-owned public accommodations.36  Some segregationists even claimed lunch
counter discrimination was constitutionally protected, under some general reference
to the rights of liberty, property, or freedom of association.37  On the other side, law-
yers from civil rights organizations such as the NAACP quickly arrived on the scene
of the demonstrations, seeking to appeal protester convictions in order to establish
Fourteenth Amendment test cases.  But it was not just the civil rights lawyers who
transformed the protests into a platform for constitutional reconstruction.  The his-
torical moment in which the sit-ins took place ensured that the protests would be
understood as raising not just a moral or legal but a constitutional claim.  Most im-
portantly, the shadow of Brown v. Board of Education shaped how the nation per-
ceived the sit-ins.  The uncertain status of the state action doctrine in 1960, reflected
in the spectrum of predictions about which way the Court was likely to rule in the
sit-in cases, extended beyond court decisions and law school commentary.  Brown—
and particularly the series of per curiam decisions that followed, extending Brown’s
desegregation mandate to public beaches, golf courses, buses, and other publicly con-
trolled facilities38—convinced many observers that the logic of Brown applied to all
facilities that open their doors to the public, even those privately owned.  At the time
of the sit-ins, both allies and opponents of the civil rights movement understood the
lunch counter protests as an issue to be resolved through a struggle over the meaning
of the Constitution.
A. Civil Disobedience as a Constitutional Claim
The idea of civil disobedience as a constitutional claim is at once controversial
and banal.  The concept undoubtedly carries with it deeply subversive connotations.
Yet to consider civil disobedience as a potential technique of constitutional claim-
making, one must first reject the assumption that civil disobedience represents a
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categorical abandonment of law and constitutionalism.  The United States, as prac-
tically every American proponent of the value of civil disobedience has pointed out,
was born of collective law-breaking.39  Advocates of civil disobedience during the
civil rights movement frequently emphasized its long American heritage.40
Although the term “civil disobedience” may be used loosely to cover acts that are
in fact subversive of the legal system, political and legal theorists have offered more
rigorous definitions that emphasize the constructive role of civil disobedience in the
legal system.  John Rawls, for example, defined civil disobedience as “a public, non-
violent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of
bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.”41  Robert Cover’s
definition—“[t]he decision to act in accord with an understanding of the law validated
by the actor’s own community but repudiated by the officialdom of the state”42—
highlights the cultural roots of the protesters’ alternative vision of the law, thereby
emphasizing the “jurisgenerative” capacity of civil disobedience.43  A protest com-
munity can generate an alternative vision of the law that, through an act of civil dis-
obedience, is placed in conflict with the existing legal system.  Out of this conflict, new
legal norms can emerge.  “In law,” observed Paul A. Freund, “creativity is a product
of the tension between heresy and heritage.”44
The key point, then, is that civil disobedience can be an act of respect for the basic
institutions of a society.  Judge Frank Johnson once described civil disobedience as
“a procedure for challenging law or policy.”45  This paradoxical idea—respecting the
law by breaking a law—was exemplified by the version of civil disobedience prac-
ticed by Martin Luther King, Jr., and the sit-in protesters.46  King’s advocacy of break-
ing laws “open[ly], loving[ly],” only makes sense, Stephen Carter has noted, “if one
first accepts the essential justness of the state.”47  “[T]he individual who disobeys the
law, whose conscience tells him it is unjust and who is willing to accept the penalty
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by staying in jail until that law is altered,” King explained, “is expressing at the
moment the very highest respect for law.”48  The belief that an open act of disobedi-
ence can cause change is, at bottom, a statement of faith in the existing legal order.
B. State Action as a Normative Concept
In its narrowest form, the state action doctrine is quite straightforward: the
Fourteenth Amendment restricts government, not private individuals.  The text of
the amendment is relatively clear on this question,49 and the seminal articulation of
the state action doctrine, the 1883 Civil Rights Cases,50 embraced the basic public-
private dichotomy on which the doctrine was based.  “[C]ivil rights, such as are
guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the
wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws,
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings.  The wrongful act of an individual . . .
is simply a private wrong . . . .”51  The Court has never abandoned this basic principle.
Chief Justice Vinson wrote over a half-century later in Shelley v. Kraemer:
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, . . . the
principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law
that the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment is only such action as may fairly be said to be that
of the States.  That Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.52
The Court has reiterated this basic point ever since.
As the legal realists emphasized decades before the civil rights era, however, in
modern society there is no unproblematic, neutral manner by which the line between
the public and private spheres can be drawn.53  The modern regulatory state that
emerged in the New Deal put these realists’ insights into effect; and a centerpiece of
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the Supreme Court’s constitutional “revolution” of the New Deal era was a rejection
of a formalist reliance on a strict public-private divide.54  The public-private distinction
on which the state action doctrine relies is incomprehensible without a recognition
of the socially constructed nature of the distinction.  This, in turn, depends upon
assumptions regarding the relative importance of nondiscrimination in certain activ-
ities and societal expectations of the appropriate scope of government responsibility
to confront discriminatory action.55
In other words, state action is essentially a normative concept.  In practically any
situation that would arise as a site of significant social contestation, state involvement
of some sort can be located.56  Far from comparing the factual situation of a case to
some predetermined standard of official responsibility for nominally private action,
difficult state action cases in which the Court finds the requisite official involvement
end up being exercises in, as Charles Black put it, “noting and clarifying yet another
of the wonderfully variegated ways in which the Briarean state can put its hundred
hands on life.”57  State action might be found in state support or encouragement of pri-
vate choice;58 the involvement of police or the courts in enforcing private decisions;59
licensing or regulatory schemes;60 the existence of durable customs that can be traced
to prior or ongoing state action;61 the recognition that nominally private action is
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serving a particularly public function62 or affecting a public interest;63 or the acknowl-
edgment that when the state has the capacity to act, the absence of state involvement is
itself a choice—is itself a form of state “action.”64  The critical analysis then centers on
the nature of state involvement and the relative value of the claimed right— judgments
that draw on generally held norms and expectations.  For this reason, the state action
doctrine has always been particularly responsive to social and cultural transformations.
C. The State of the State Action Doctrine, 1960
The unavoidable normativity of the state action requirement has meant that the
historical development of the doctrine has mirrored evolving social norms and expec-
tations of government responsibilities.  In the context of civil rights, the state action
doctrine has been particularly responsive to changes in popular attitudes toward the
responsibility of government to ensure equal protection of the law.  It was within the
context of a national retreat from the project of Reconstruction that the traditional
state action doctrine was first given form, most definitively in the 1883 Civil Rights
Cases.65  Generations later, the strength of the moral claim of civil rights for African
Americans in the middle decades of the twentieth century brought the first sustained
judicial reconsideration of the state action doctrine since its inception in the late
nineteenth century.
For the two decades preceding the sit-in cases, the Court steadily expanded its
definition of state action, sometimes in potentially quite radical ways, to cover more
and more acts that had previously been relegated to the private sphere.  Indeed, during
the 1940s, the Court appeared to be pressing more aggressively against the premises
of the Civil Rights Cases than against Plessy v. Ferguson66 and the separate-but-equal
doctrine.67  One of the most consequential civil rights decisions of the pre-Brown
period was Smith v. Allwright,68 in which the Court struck down the all-white pri-
mary.  This case, decided in 1944, overruled a precedent of strikingly recent vintage:
just nine years earlier, in Grovey v. Townsend,69 the Court had unanimously rejected
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a challenge to a “white primary” on the basis that the primary was run by a political
party, which was not a state actor under the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.70
The Court’s about-face on the state action question came in a 8-1 ruling that empha-
sized the extent of state involvement in the primary process, including various require-
ments and oversight processes.71  At times, the language of the opinion seemed to go
beyond a narrow “state entanglement” rationale, suggesting that the state bore a gen-
eral responsibility for the electoral process even in the absence of specific regulations.72
Another important line of development in the state action doctrine during this
period came in Justice Black’s 1946 decision in Marsh v. Alabama.73  This case in-
volved a private “company town” that the Court held was a public entity for purposes
of the First Amendment.74  Because it had assumed all the functions of a traditional
municipality, it therefore took on the additional constitutional responsibilities.75
Black’s opinion for the Court drew on his aggressive New Deal sensibilities, empha-
sizing the limitations of private property rights and the responsibilities that accompany
involvement in the economic sphere: “Ownership does not always mean absolute
dominion.  The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it.”76  These words would feature prominently
in the constitutional arguments of the civil rights lawyers in the sit-in cases.77
The most potentially transformative state action decision in the pre-Brown period
was the 1948 restrictive covenant decision, Shelley v. Kraemer.78  In Shelley the Court
held that judicial enforcement of private agreements to refuse to sell property to
African Americans violated the Equal Protection Clause.79  While reaffirming the
basic state action requirement, Chief Justice Vinson’s opinion for the unanimous
Court dramatically expanded the scope of state action.  “We have no doubt that there
has been state action in these cases in the full and complete sense of the phrase,” wrote
Vinson.80  “It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, sup-
ported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy
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the properties in question without restraint.”81  In this circumstance at least, state
enforcement of private discriminatory behavior constituted state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment: “State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes
of the Fourteenth Amendment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms.”82
As one scholar after another has noted, it is hard to know what to make of Shelley;
it is, as Philip Kurland wryly put it, “constitutional law’s Finnegan’s Wake.”83  Logi-
cally, the idea that judicial enforcement of a private agreement constitutes state action
effectively destroys the concept of state action altogether.  “That the action of the
state court is action of the state . . . is, of course, entirely obvious,” wrote Herbert
Wechsler in a famous critique of Shelley.84  “What is not obvious, and is the crucial
step, is that the state may properly be charged with discrimination when it does no
more than give effect to an agreement that the individual involved is, by hypothesis,
entirely free to make.”85  To this crucial question, Wechsler lamented, the Court
offered little guidance.86  While there have been many subsequent scholarly efforts
to reconstruct (or rewrite) the rationale of Shelley,87 the decision itself offers little
doctrinal insight.  And, more significantly, the Court never embraced the far-reaching
implications of Shelley.88  Just two years later it denied certiorari in a case in which the
New York Court of Appeals found no state action in a racial discrimination claim
against a private housing developer, even though the developer had received exten-
sive state support in the form of land condemnation, street closings, and a twenty-five-
year tax exemption.89  In non-race cases in particular, the Supreme Court quickly
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reasserted a traditional, limited conception of state action.90  Shelley turned out to
be a singular case—it is best understood as a court putting aside doctrinal complexities
in order to attack an immoral and socially destructive practice.91  Yet, at the time, some
civil rights lawyers and legal scholars saw the decision as a harbinger of the demise of
the state action doctrine.92  While the central argument pressed by the Justice Depart-
ment lawyers in Shelley was that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants con-
stituted state action, they also rejected the idea that the state action requirement of
the Fourteenth Amendment, as traditionally defined, was settled law.93  One could
find ample support for this point in law reviews in the years following Shelley.94
The moderate expansion of the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment through
these state action cases attracted considerable attention from scholars.  Some sug-
gested that the Court had fundamentally destabilized state action doctrine through
its recent decisions and therefore they had little idea what to expect next.95  Some
scholars urged the Court to go much farther down the path it had suggested in cases
such as Shelley and Marsh.  In a frequently cited 1957 law review article, Harold W.
Horowitz argued for a radical broadening of the concept of state action, concluding
that when the state places a private discriminator’s interest to be free of interference in
the balance with the right to racially equal treatment, it has already become involved—
the choice itself constitutes state action.96  This approach relied on the essential insight
of the legal realists, that with the opportunity for action comes responsibility for not
acting.97  Horowitz’s article was just one of many state action critiques published in
the years leading up to the sit-in movement.98
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Thus, while existing case law appeared against the students,99 those sympathetic
to the interests of the civil rights movement saw hope in the relative fluidity of state
action doctrine during this period and the trend of the Court toward supporting in-
creasing federal intervention into Jim Crow laws and practices.100  “[I]n this field, the
law is an evolving thing,” wrote a Washington Post reporter.101
An assertion that would have been laughed out of court 20 years
ago may be an established right today after a long step-by-step
process of fashioning a new rule.  The courts may not rule today
that Negroes have a right to eat beside white persons in private
stores.  They might so rule three or five or 10 years from now
after taking it a piece at a time.102
The instability of the state action doctrine in the early 1960s meant any effort at an
objective reading of state action invariably turned into either a prediction of where
the Court was heading or an argument for what the doctrine should be.  Those who
were critical of the students’ cause tended to reject their constitutional claim.103  A
more moderate view was often to recognize the students’ claim as raising a moral
or policy question, but to argue that they had no right, as a matter of constitutional
law, to service in privately-owned public accommodations.104  And those who
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expressed the strongest sympathy for the students’ cause regularly predicted that
they would triumph on their constitutional claims.105
Thus, in 1960 the legal basis of the sit-ins was deeply contested, the product of
instability inherent in the state action concept itself and shifting judicial interpretations
of state action in the middle decades of the twentieth century.  It was this background
of constitutional ambiguity that allowed the sit-ins to prove such a powerful challenge
not only to the customs and laws of the Jim Crow South, but also to the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  The demonstrations constituted a potentially transfor-
mative intervention in an ongoing dialogue between the courts and society on the
constitutionality of certain forms of private discrimination.
D. Public Accommodations and the “Logic” of Brown106
At the time of the sit-ins, the trend of the Supreme Court’s state action decisions
led many observers with legal expertise to wonder whether the days of the state action
doctrine, as traditionally understood, were numbered.107  But for those less versed in
the nuances of constitutional doctrine, the decisions that came most readily to mind
were the school desegregation cases.  Lawyers and legal scholars recognized that as
a matter of constitutional law a substantial doctrinal leap was necessary to get from
Brown, dealing with unquestionable state actors (schools), to a constitutional hold-
ing prohibiting discrimination in privately-owned public accommodations.108  But
in the popular discourse surrounding the sit-ins, the belief was commonplace that
the public accommodation problem could be dealt with through the same constitu-
tional principle as the school segregation problem.109  Increased attention to the impact
of the school desegregation decisions on popular constitutional expectations offers
an additional angle on understanding Brown’s relation to the direct action phase of
the civil rights movement.
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Scholars have recently challenged traditional assumptions that Brown provided
the spark that ignited the civil rights movement.110  For decades after Brown, the stan-
dard approach has been to describe Brown as making possible the protests of the civil
rights movement.111  Beginning in the 1990s, revisionists challenged these claims that
Brown did much to inspire the civil rights movement.  Gerald Rosenberg has argued
that Brown had minimal effect on the civil rights movement.112  Michael Klarman has
argued that the decision’s most significant effects were indirect: the decision mobilized
the white South to resist segregation at all costs, leading to the bloody and highly pub-
licized confrontations in Birmingham, Selma, and elsewhere, which in turn led to
increased support in the North for civil rights and transformative legislation such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.113
With regard to the sit-ins, the evidence suggests that the traditional claims that
Brown served as some kind of inspiration for the students is very much overblown—
on this basic point the revisionists are largely right.  When discussing what moved them
to take action, the students did not talk about the Supreme Court or even Thurgood
Marshall and the NAACP’s litigation efforts.114  As Howard Zinn noted in his con-
temporaneous history of the student activists, “[t]o these young people, the Supreme
Court decision of 1954 was a childhood memory.”115
Yet Brown affected the students in other ways.  Most obviously, it raised expec-
tations for change that failed to materialize—the students acted out of a mixture of
inspiration and frustration.  Many of the students cited the experience of the students
at Little Rock in 1957 as deeply influential for them (the Greensboro Four were about
the same age as the nine black students who desegregated Little Rock’s Central High
School).116  And many referenced frustration with the glacial pace of school desegre-
gation in the South as motivation for their audacious and innovative challenge.117
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Furthermore, the school desegregation decisions played a critical role in shaping
the way the nation understood the significance of the sit-ins.  Brown helped define the
issues of concern and the terms of debate for the sit-ins.  Particularly relevant was
the series of per curiam decisions that, following Brown, extended the constitutional
desegregation requirement beyond schools to public parks, auditoriums, golf courses,
beaches, and buses.118  By 1960, the refutation of the separate-but-equal principle had
moved beyond schools into all areas of public life that fell under direct state control.
The question for many civil rights supporters, then, was whether this trend would
eventually encompass restaurants and hotels and other facilities that, while privately
owned, opened their doors to the general public.119
These developments convinced many observers that the “logic” of Brown applied
to public accommodations.  A generation of shifts in constitutional doctrine by the
Supreme Court had destabilized any comfortable assumptions about the reach of the
constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination, thereby giving an opening in the
public discourse in which the claim embodied by the students in their sit-in protests
could be understood as a viable challenge to existing conceptions of the limits of the
Equal Protection Clause—that is, a challenge to traditional conceptions of state action.
The application of the Brown principle to public accommodations was common-
place in the early 1960s.  For example, when Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke to the stu-
dent participants in the sit-in movement, he described the challenge they faced as the
logical extension of the school segregation struggle.  “Separate facilities, whether in
eating places or public schools, are inherently unequal,” he told the students, echoing
the famous words of Warren’s Brown opinion.120  While such a statement by a leading
civil rights advocate is best understood as a claim for a reformed vision of justice, in-
formed by the constitutional equality principle, the striking point is that the implication
of King’s statement, that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the students’ actions,
was echoed throughout the discussions of the sit-ins—often from unexpected quarters.
Consider the words of President Eisenhower soon after the sit-ins spread across
the South.  Responding to a question about the protests at a press conference, he noted
that “[my] own understanding is that when an establishment belongs to the public,
opened under public charter and so on, equal rights are involved.”121  He added that
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demonstrations . . . marching in the streets, or any other kind of
peaceful assembly that is trying to show what the aspirations
and the desires of a people are . . . as long as they are in orderly
fashion, are not only constitutional, they have been recognized
in our country as proper since we have been founded.122
Later that spring, he made another effort to explain his position on the constitutional
status of the sit-ins.  “[W]e have a responsibility in helping to enforce or seeing that
the constitutional rights guaranteed are not violated,” he stated, before wavering and
claiming uncertainty about the constitutional status of these protests.123  Eisenhower’s
public comments highlight the fact that the constitutional claims raised by the sit-ins
were, at minimum, viable in public discourse.  The students had effectively destabi-
lized any certainty that the Brown decision did not logically entail the desegregation
of restaurants.  Even a President who was notoriously reluctant to endorse Brown124
was inclined to view the issue as raising basic constitutional issues—and to side with
the students.
Despite considerable discomfort with direct action protests as a tactic for reform,
the protesters garnered a remarkable level of sympathy and support throughout the
nation.  “By the end of the first month,” noted an approving observer, “the sit-ins had
made firm their roots in popular support.”125  Presidential candidate John F. Kennedy
praised the sit-ins, declaring, “‘[i]t is in the American tradition to stand up for one’s
rights—even if the new way to stand up for one’s rights is to sit down’”; and he called
for “‘equal access to the voting booth, to the schoolroom, to jobs, to housing and to
public facilities, including lunch rooms.’”126 Eleanor Roosevelt publicly backed the
sit-ins,127 and both the Republican and Democratic Party platforms in 1960 included
expressions of support for the protests.128  Arguing before the Supreme Court in a 1960
case unrelated to the sit-in movement but raising analogous constitutional claims,
Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin urged the Court to revise its state action doctrine to
protect against racially discriminatory treatment in all public accommodations.129  The
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following year, Attorney General Robert Kennedy publicly backed the students’ cause
and privately backed their constitutional claim.130  The six-year experience with school
integration as a constitutional issue allowed for this sort of intuitive transformation
of the sit-ins into a constitutional issue to which the logic of Brown’s desegregation
principle seemed to apply.  “It seems clear that this ‘lunch counter movement’ will
become a historic milestone in the American Negro’s efforts to win the rights of
citizenship which are guaranteed him by the Constitution,” declared Commonweal
magazine.131
This trend accelerated in the following years.  President Kennedy gave an address
in February 1963 in which he said: “No act is more contrary to the spirit of our
democracy and Constitution—or more rightfully resented by a Negro citizen who
seeks only equal treatment—than the barring of that citizen from restaurants, hotels,
theatres, recreational areas and other public accommodations and facilities.”132  Later
that spring, in announcing his support for federal civil rights legislation, Kennedy
declared the “right to be served in facilities which are open to the public” to be an
“elementary” right and one of “the privileges of being American,” comparable to
education and voting.133
If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a res-
taurant open to the public, if he cannot send his children to the best
public school available, if he cannot vote for the public officials
who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free
life which all of us want, then who among us would be content to
have the color of his skin changed and stand in his place?134
Thus, in numerous public forums, the constitutional claims raised by the sit-in
protesters were embraced.  As a claim pressed upon national opinion and the political
branches of government, the students’ actions, in effect, offered a persuasive reinter-
pretation of the scope of the equal protection of the law.  By protesting at privately-
owned lunch counters, at municipal pools, in bus terminals, in the libraries, and in
other publicly-owned places, and by arguing that segregation in all these places raised
the same fundamental concerns about dignity and citizenship, the protesters were
making a case to the larger society that the principle of equal protection entailed a gov-
ernment responsibility to stand on the side of those combating the most egregious
manifestations of Jim Crow, regardless of whether existing constitutional doctrine
2010] THE SIT-INS AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 791
135 The Proper Role of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10
WAYNE L. REV. 457, 477 (1964) (transcript of panel remarks).
136 Id.
137 See supra Part II.A.
138 THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 718 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter
IN CONFERENCE].
139 See supra Part II.A.
140 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 284 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (appendix list-
ing state public accommodations laws); William E. Blundell, 30 States, Some Cities Bar
Discrimination in Public Accommodations, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22, 1963, at 1; Survey Shows
Rights Laws Now Cover 65% of Nation, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1963, at A17.
delineated these acts as “private” or not.  The stage was set, it seemed, for an official
reconsideration of the state action doctrine.
II. THE SIT-IN CASES IN THE SUPREME COURT
“The Court is our greatest educational institution,” explained Alexander Bickel
in the spring of 1963.135
It may bring a question up to the forefront of public conscious-
ness, reduce it, and play with it—sort of a cat and mouse game,
perhaps—until there comes a moment of inarticulable judgment,
of political feel, not at all different from the sense of timing that
other political officers have, when the time seems ripe for a final
adjudication. And the Court will then act.136
Only in the sit-in cases, even when the time was surely “ripe” by the Warren Court’s
typical standards, when the cultural work of the civil rights movement was well under-
way and its achievement unmistakable, the Court still refused to act.  In one of the
most striking developments of the Warren Court era, the Court ducked, repeatedly,
a major civil rights issue that was winning widespread public support.  An informal
agreement emerged among the Justices (save for Justice Douglas) that minimalist
holdings were best in these cases, at least for a time.137  Chief Justice Warren explained
the strategy as “tak[ing] these cases step by step, not reaching the final question until
much experience had been had.”138  The Court would overturn convictions of the sit-
in protesters, but on narrow grounds, reserving the difficult state action question.139
The puzzle is, then, why the Court never decided the constitutional question, even
when public opinion had clearly swung behind the basic rightness of the equality prin-
ciple put forth by the sit-ins.  By the time the Court faced Bell v. Maryland, a majority
of the nation lived under state or local laws requiring nondiscriminatory access to
public accommodation.140  In June 1963, approval for the proposed federal civil rights
legislation was at about the same level—approximately 50%—as approval for school
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desegregation had been in 1956.141  In the coming months, approval for the Civil Rights
Act increased steadily; after the passage of the bill in the House in February 1964,
approval was at 68%.142  Despite this transformation taking place outside the Court,
by late 1963, when a majority of the Court felt compelled it was time to face the con-
stitutional issue squarely, a majority stood poised to reassert the Court’s commitment
to the state action doctrine and to decide in favor of the claims of the discriminating
lunch counter operators.143
Why they did so has traditionally been explained by pointing to two factors.  First,
it is often assumed that the Court would have found a way to decide in favor of the
protesters, perhaps confronting the constitutional issue in the process, if Congress
had not stepped in with Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.144  Second, many legal
scholars have emphasized the doctrinal and institutional difficulties that would have
been raised in expanding state action to encompass public accommodations, and attrib-
ute the resilience of the state action doctrine to this factor.145  The following account
of the sit-in cases does not refute either of these factors.  Each played an important role
in the outcome of the issue.  But they fail to capture the whole story.  While it is likely
that the pending federal civil rights bill helped dissolve a late-forming majority to
decide the constitutional issue in Bell in favor of the protesters, this explanation only
captures the closing weeks of the term; between October 1963 and the mid-spring of
1964, a majority of the Justices were ready to reject the protesters’ constitutional claim,
even when it was uncertain that federal public accommodations legislation would
pass.  And while doctrinal and institutional constraints undoubtedly contributed to
the hesitancy of some Justices to accept the state action arguments put forth by the
NAACP lawyers, this factor fails to capture the thinking of Justice Black, the person
who more than anyone else on the Court shaped the terms of debate in the sit-in cases.
A. From Burton to Bell
The Court’s first confrontations with the sit-in cases laid the foundations for a
subsequent transformation of state action.  Although the facts of the first cases allowed
for relatively limited holdings, their reasoning and language were potentially expan-
sive.  Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority146 involved racial discrimination in
a privately run restaurant located in a space leased from the city.  The Court located
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the necessary state involvement in the nominally private discriminatory choice to
satisfy the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.147  The analysis in
the majority opinion, written by Justice Tom Clark, relied upon what was essentially
a context-driven balancing test to evaluate whether there was the necessary state en-
tanglement with private action to constitute state action.  The test for when “nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct” can violate the Equal Protection Clause
requires “sifting facts and weighing circumstances.”148  Clark then went further—
potentially much further—by recognizing state “inaction” in the face of private dis-
crimination as an element in finding state action,149 a reference with dramatic impli-
cations.  In suggesting the existence of affirmative government obligations under the
Equal Protection Clause, Clark opened the door to a radical reworking of govern-
ment’s constitutional responsibilities.150
Burton was not technically a sit-in case; the case derived from an unplanned,
isolated event that occurred in 1958.  The first case that arose out of the student sit-
in movement of 1960 to reach the Court was Garner v. Louisiana.151  Chief Justice
Warren was initially inclined to decide the constitutional issues in favor of the pro-
testers, holding the students’ actions were protected under both the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.152  Frankfurter prevailed on him to issue a more limited opinion.  In
a letter to the Chief Justice, Frankfurter explained that the sit-in cases
go to the very heart of constitutional views regarding state-federal
relations, the rights of the individual against the coercive power
of the State. . . .  [T]hey should be disposed of on the narrowest
allowable grounds. . . .  I would make of this a little case, precisely
for the reason that we are all fully conscious of the fact that it is
just the beginning of a long story.153
He preferred to “creep along rather than be general,” Frankfurter told the Justices.154
Warren eventually agreed that, at this point, narrower holdings were preferable.155
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Douglas, unaffected by Frankfurter’s concerns, forged ahead in his concurrence
and decided the Fourteenth Amendment issue.  He put forth a variety of rationales for
locating state action.  He offered sweeping rhetorical assertions: “[T]he police are
supposed to be on the side of the Constitution, not on the side of discrimination.”156
He staked out a broad claim for reconceptualizing the constitutional status of public
accommodations: “Restaurants, whether in a drugstore, department store, or bus ter-
minal, are a part of the public life of most of our communities.  Though they are pri-
vate enterprises, they are public facilities in which the States may not enforce a policy
of racial segregation.”157  He argued the Shelley rationale that judicial enforcement
constituted state action,158 and he sought to include pervasive community customs
and practices as a form of state action.159  In a more closely reasoned section of his
concurrence, he argued that the fact that state and local governments granted licenses
to restaurants implicated the state in their discriminatory practices.160  Subsequent
efforts to reconsider the state action requirement, both in the courts and in Congress,
frequently used the various claims Douglas presented in Garner as a basis for debate.
In some ways, Burton and Garner would prove to be the furthest the Court
would go toward recognizing the students’ actions as constitutionally protected.  The
Court would continue to find ways to overturn the convictions of the protesters with-
out deciding the Fourteenth Amendment issue.161  Yet the way in which the Justices
went about avoiding the constitutional question is revealing.  It demonstrated the
Court’s unwillingness to directly confront the students’ challenge to traditional,
legalistic definitions of public and private space or their emphasis on human dignity
as a component of the constitutional analysis of equal protection.  Rather, the Court
focused on reforming southern states, pressuring them to abide by the rule of law as
established in Brown.
The sit-in cases gave the Court the opportunity to continue the work of the school
segregation cases.  The Justices avoided the difficult constitutional question behind
the sit-ins by focusing on misbehavior by Southern state actors—actions that defied
the Court’s Brown mandate.  They used the sit-in cases to create incentives for the
southern states to get rid of any hint of official segregation.  They would overturn
any conviction, even if based on an ostensibly private discriminatory choice, if the
state had on the books a law requiring segregated public accommodations.  The mere
presence of a segregation ordinance was enough—even when the prosecution at issue
was not based on that ordinance and there was no evidence that the law influenced
the proprietor’s decision to discriminate.162  If there were no segregation laws on
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the books, any expressed support for segregated public accommodations by local
officials would do the job.163  Official action in support of segregation, rather than the
student demand for service, became the illegality that needed to be countered; the
proper path toward restoring order was to get the state out of the business of directly
supporting segregation.
These cases have often been explained as an effort by the Supreme Court Justices
to balance their sympathy for the protesters with concerns about the doctrinal and
institutional implications of ruling in their favor on constitutional grounds.164  A rec-
ognition of the basic unjustness of the protesters’ convictions played a role in these
cases, to be sure, but the text of the opinions and the internal history of the Court’s
deliberations indicate that the path of decision-making is better explained by a focus
not on the protesters, but on the states.  Support for the protesters was incidental to
the central message of the sit-in cases, which was directed at state officials.  This mes-
sage was simple: stop defying Brown.  Thus, the sit-in cases were as much the progeny
of Cooper v. Aaron,165 a ruling that denounced defiance of the Supreme Court, as state
action cases such as Shelley v. Kraemer166 or Marsh v. Alabama.167  In Cooper, the
Court dedicated itself to attacking official segregation policy even when the state made
efforts to hide its role: “[T]he prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to
all action of the State denying equal protection of the laws . . . whatever the guise in
which it is taken . . . .”168  By the early 1960s, the logic of Brown, both doctrinally and
culturally, had come to stand for the position that state-supported segregation was un-
constitutional, including efforts to cloak official segregation policy as private action.
The sit-in cases gave the Court an opportunity to pressure the states to abandon laws
and official practices that supported segregation.
B. Bell v. Maryland
The Justices’ exclusive focus on official state action made Bell v. Maryland,169
first considered in the fall of 1963, particularly challenging.  Here the state as a bad
actor was less evident.  Indeed, since the students had been arrested, Maryland had
passed a public accommodations law.170  The Justices could no longer divert attention
from the possible illegality of the protests through their hunt for more fundamental
illegality by the state.  In Bell it appeared that the Justices finally had a sit-in case in
which there was no way to avoid the constitutional issue.
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Yet the Court ducked once again.  Avoidance of the constitutional issue here
required a novel argument, put forth by Justice Brennan, that the passage of state and
local public accommodations laws following the demonstrators’ convictions was
grounds for reversal.  The sit-ins “would not be a crime today,”171 he wrote in the
controlling opinion, and therefore it would be unjust to allow the convictions to stand.
Although six Justices wanted the constitutional issue resolved, they split evenly on
whether to side with the claims of the demonstrators or the restaurant owners, mak-
ing Brennan’s end run around the constitutional issue the opinion of the Court, and
leaving existing state action doctrine largely intact.172
Prior to Brennan’s discovery of a nonconstitutional basis for the decision, the
Justices were prepared to face the constitutional issue—and to rule against the pro-
testers.173  In the fall of 1963 the Court divided 5-4 on the constitutional question,
with Black taking on the drafting of the majority opinion (joined by Clark, Harlan,
Stewart, and White), affirming the convictions and reasserting the principle that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to private discrimination and that a restaurant
owner’s policy of whom to serve was a private choice.  As late as March 1964, Justice
Clark was assuring Justice Goldberg that Black’s majority was “absolutely solid and
indestructible.”174  Yet by late spring Black had lost his majority, largely because
Brennan was able to locate his more limited grounds for overturning the convictions
and because he was able to convince Clark and Stewart that upholding the convictions
would hurt the pending federal civil rights legislation.175  The closing months of the
term brought rapidly shifting alliances of the Justices in Bell; for a brief time in June,
it even appeared that Justice Clark would write an opinion of the Court deciding the
constitutional issue in favor of the protesters.176  The final decision, handed down on
June 22, 1964, just weeks before passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, came to no
such resolutions.177  Clark and Stewart joined Brennan’s opinion, disposing of the
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case without reaching the merits of the constitutional claim;178 White and Harlan
joined Black’s opinion finding no state action;179 and Warren, Goldberg, and Douglas
all expressed a willingness to find racial discrimination in public accommodations
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.180
The six Justices who were willing to face the constitutional question in Bell all
believed that the Court had a responsibility to offer a clear, principled resolution to
the sit-in controversy that would restore law and order to a national situation that
risked spiraling out of control.  They differed sharply, however, on whether those who
were demanding change or those who were committed to preserving the status quo
were more to blame for the disorder.  In the context of the sit-in cases, the question
came down to which party was the primary lawbreaker, the discriminating proprietor
or the sit-in demonstrator.  This question had a circularity to it, of course, because
locating the source of the breakdown of the rule of law required a prior judgment
about what the law actually required in this situation.  The text of the Bell opinions
and the internal history of the Justices’ deliberation in this case indicate that the crucial
judgment of which party was acting outside the law had as much to do with judicial
attitudes toward civil disobedience as a tactic for claiming a new legal right as it did
with the abstract question of whether the discriminatory choice was truly private.
The concurrences by Douglas and Goldberg, in which they argued that the right
to nondiscriminatory service in public accommodations was constitutionally pro-
tected, laid out the terms of the problem.  “The whole Nation has to face the issue,”
Douglas wrote.181
Congress is conscientiously considering it; some municipalities
have had to make it their first order of concern; law enforcement
officials are deeply implicated, North as well as South; the ques-
tion is at the root of demonstrations, unrest, riots, and violence
in various areas.  The issue in other words consumes the public
attention.  Yet we stand mute, avoiding decision of the basic issue
by an obvious pretense.182
Douglas expressed as much concern with preserving order and law as his more con-
servative colleagues: “When we default, as we do today, the prestige of law in the life
of the Nation is weakened.”183
Goldberg also positioned himself as attacking lawlessness.  A state should not
be permitted to abridge the constitutional right of nondiscriminatory access to places
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of public accommodations by “legitimating a proprietor’s attempt at self-help” through
enforcement of trespassing laws.184  He quoted from Cooper v. Aaron, noting that
“law and order are not . . . to be preserved by depriving the Negro . . . of [his] consti-
tutional rights,”185 and challenged Black’s dire warning of the need to protect property
rights in the name of preserving order.  “Of course every member of this Court agrees
that law and order must prevail; the question is whether the weight and protective
strength of law and order will be cast in favor of the claims of the proprietors or in
favor of the claims of petitioners.”186
In his long, impassioned dissent, Black argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
does not apply to choices made by restaurant owners “in the absence of some coop-
erative state action or compulsion.”187  “It would betray our whole plan for a tranquil
and orderly society,” Black asserted, “to say that a citizen, because of his personal prej-
udices, habits, attitudes, or beliefs, is cast outside the law’s protection and cannot call
for the aid of officers sworn to uphold the law and preserve the peace.”188  Reading the
Fourteenth Amendment to require business owners to serve blacks would “severely
handicap a State’s efforts to maintain a peaceful and orderly society.”189  To prohibit
trespassing prosecutions in these cases would “penalize citizens who are law-abiding
enough to call upon the law and its officers for protection instead of using their own
physical strength or dangerous weapons to preserve their rights.”190  The protection
of public order, Black concluded, was the primary goal of government.
[T]he Constitution does not confer upon any group the right to
substitute rule by force for rule by law.  Force leads to violence,
violence to mob conflicts, and these to rule by the strongest
groups with control of the most deadly weapons. . . .  At times
the rule of law seems too slow to some for the settlement of their
grievances.  But it is the plan our Nation has chosen to preserve
both “Liberty” and equality for all.  On that plan we have put our
trust and staked our future.  This constitutional rule of law has
served us well.  Maryland’s trespass law does not depart from it.
Nor shall we.191
C. Civil Disobedience and the Supreme Court
As Black’s paean to “peaceful and orderly society” in his Bell dissent indicates,
one factor in the ultimate failure of the constitutional claim put forth by the students
2010] THE SIT-INS AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 799
192 See Christopher Schmidt, Hugo Black’s Civil Rights Movement, in TRANSFORMATIONS
IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON J. HORWITZ
246–66 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009).
193 NEWMAN, supra note 175, at 542.
194 Id.
195 Hugo L. Black, Conference Notes (undated) (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 376).
196 Stephens Broening, Negro Demonstrators Thrown Out By Annapolis Restaurant Owners,
WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1964, at A1 (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 376); Pickets Back at Annapolis After Talks, EVENING STAR,
Mar. 3, 1964, at A1 (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo
L. Black, Box 376).
197 See The Acid Test, EVENING STAR, June 19, 1964, at A1 (on file with Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 376); Police Club Negroes
in Motel Pool, WASH. POST, June 19, 1964, at A2 (on file with Library of Congress, Manuscript
Division, Papers of Hugo L. Black, Box 376).
in the sit-in cases was a discomfort with civil disobedience.  The concerns the Justices
had with extrajudicial methods of resistance were more pervasive and systematic and
gained strength earlier than scholars have generally appreciated.  The Warren Court’s
hesitancy on the sit-in cases was not just a visceral reaction to street demonstrations.
It was also a product of disappointment with the turn away from the courts that the
demonstrations embodied.  The Court was moved not only by a commitment to racial
equality, but also by a concern, less well recognized, with the destabilization costs
of extralegal social reform tactics.
Within the Supreme Court, no one was more antagonistic toward civil disobedience
than Justice Black.192  Black was the critical figure among the Justices who stood
opposed to the basic constitutional claim of the protesters.  His powerful and passion-
ate statements on the basic issues at stake defined the terms of the debate within the
Court.  For Black, the issue was first and foremost a question of protecting the rule
of law. “Physical protest never appealed to Black,” writes his biographer.193  “Direct
action, such as sit-ins, intentionally violated society’s necessity to maintain order, he
felt.  Public disorder threatened the fabric of democracy.”194  In conference discus-
sions, Black referenced the need to protect the associational rights of private citizens
as a basic tenet of an orderly society.  In his files relating to the October Term 1963
sit-in cases, he kept a collection of newspaper clippings filled with stories of the
escalating tensions resulting from efforts to integrate public accommodations.195  One
story told of the owner of a Maryland restaurant who, with the aid of several friends,
“hurled” a dozen civil rights demonstrators from his restaurant; the police, who were
watching this private ejection from the street, promptly arrested the protesters for
disorderly conduct.196  Another article in Black’s clippings file told of a Florida hotel
manager who poured acid into the hotel pool in order to force “integrationists” out of
the water.  When the protesters were driven from the water, “club-swinging policemen
rained blows on the heads, backs, and shoulders of the Negroes.”197  Yet another story
described the growth of “anti-white gangs” in Harlem, including ominous references
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to the training of black youths in martial arts.198  In his opinions, Justice Black re-
turned again and again to his belief that liberties ultimately suffer when protesters take
to the streets rather than rely on the courts to protect their rights.  “[M]inority groups,
I venture to suggest, are the ones who always have suffered and always will suffer
most when street multitudes are allowed to substitute their pressures for the less glam-
orous but more dependable and temperate processes of the law,” Black wrote in a
1965 dissent.199  A year later, Black wrote in an opinion for the Court: “[T]he crowd
moved by noble ideals today can become the mob ruled by hate and passion and greed
and violence tomorrow.”200
When faced with the sit-in cases, Black embraced a narrow definition of state
action as a source of social order and legal predictability.  In so doing, he turned his
back on earlier decisions in which he challenged a narrow conception of state action.
His opinion in Marsh v. Alabama included sweeping language about the need to
subordinate private property interests to constitutionally defined public interests when
property is used in a particularly public manner.201  He joined the Court’s opinion
in Shelley,202 he wrote a sweeping majority opinion in Terry v. Adams203 (a decision
extending the white primary decision of Smith v. Allwright),204 and he signed on to
Justice Douglas’s dissent in Black v. Cutter Laboratories, a 1956 case in which the
Court distinguished Shelley and refused to find state action when a court enforced
a private employment contract that, had it been with the state, would have raised due
process and First Amendment concerns.205  Similarly, Black had no apparent difficulty
with the extension of Shelley in another First Amendment case, New York Times v.
Sullivan,206 decided the same term as Bell v. Maryland, in which the Court had found
state action in judicial enforcement of libel law.207  Black simply saw state action
differently when he confronted the issue in the context of civil rights protests.
Black was not alone in his antagonistic attitude toward extralegal protest actions.
Prior to signing on to Black’s Bell dissent, Justice White drafted a brief dissent in
which he warned that treating a state trespass conviction derived from a private
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discriminatory choice as impermissible state action “would be nothing short of an
invitation to private warfare and a complete negation of the central peace-keeping
function of the State.”208  Along with Justice Harlan, who also joined Black’s dissent,
Justices Black and White constituted a solid bloc of Justices whose instinctive reaction
against direct-action protest likely contributed to their staunch opposition to using
the sit-in cases as a platform for a reconsideration of the state action doctrine.
Although Black’s unwillingness to extend judicial protection to those excluded
from public accommodations might be explained in terms of the limits of judicial
competence, this was generally not the way he justified his position either in confer-
ence or in his opinions.209  Rather, he emphasized the risks of lawless behavior by
protesters and the need for courts to strictly enforce property rights.210  For Black, the
critical difference between the courts and legislatures with regard to the sit-ins might
have been that courts confer retrospective approval for past behavior, while a legis-
lature makes a new legal standard that is typically applied prospectively.  For a court
to rule that the actions of the sit-in demonstrators were in fact constitutionally pro-
tected might allow, indeed encourage, future lawbreaking whenever a legal standard
was ambiguous or strongly contested.
This problem of the retroactive approval of civil disobedience came to the fore-
front in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,211 the last of the sit-in cases.  In a 5-4 decision,
the Court held that the passage of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act abated all pend-
ing convictions of sit-in protesters.212  Despite congressional silence on the effect of
Title II on pending appeals, the majority found grounds for applying it retrospec-
tively.213  Through the mechanism of statutory interpretation, the Justices, in effect,
used the legislature as a laundering mechanism for getting rid of thousands of sit-in
appeals.  Justice Clark’s opinion for the majority noted that “the law generally con-
demns self-help,” but the new federal law created a right that immunizes from prose-
cution “nonforcible attempts to gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered
by the Act.”214  “The great purpose of the civil rights legislation was to obliterate the
effect of a distressing chapter of our history. . . .  The peaceful conduct for which
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petitioners were prosecuted was on behalf of a principle since embodied in the law
of the land.”215
Black would have none of this.  “[O]ne of the chief purposes of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act,” he wrote in dissent, “was to take such disputes [over access to public
accommodations] out of the streets and restaurants and into the courts . . . .”216  Justice
White was similarly outraged at the Court’s acceptance of civil disobedience.  “Whether
persons or groups should engage in nonviolent disobedience to laws with which they
disagree perhaps defies any categorical answer for the guidance of every individual
in every circumstance.  But whether a court should give it wholesale sanction is a
wholly different question which calls for only one answer.”217
The Court of the late 1960s would show less tolerance for civil rights protest than
it had in the early years of the civil rights movement.218  Yet the sit-in cases demon-
strate that ever-present concerns with civil disobedience affected the Court’s evalu-
ation of constitutional issues that ultimately went well beyond free speech rights for
protests.  After some initial ground-laying in the 1961 cases, it seemed the more the
Court engaged with the issue, the less disposed some of the Justices were toward the
Fourteenth Amendment claim of the protesters.  Those Justices who felt most com-
mitted to using the Constitution to uproot private discriminatory practices failed to
offer their more skeptical colleagues a persuasive defense of the protesters’ cause, pre-
ferring instead to work within the doctrinal framework of existing state action doc-
trine, in which they sniffed out any hint of state complicity in segregation and then
argued that this involvement justified the application of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This approach fit well with the work the Court already had been doing in Brown and
Cooper, but it resulted in a striking disconnect between the Court’s definition of the
reach of equal protection rights and an emerging societal recognition of the centrality
of desegregated public accommodations to the civil rights project.
III. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 AND CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
In addition to the Supreme Court’s confrontation with the sit-in cases, the other
critical episode in the story of the sit-ins and state action doctrine took place in
Congress.  With considerable guidance from the Kennedy administration’s Justice
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Department, congressional civil rights advocates began in 1963 to press for a federal
public accommodations law.  In attempting to locate the appropriate source of con-
gressional power to pass such a law, they joined the Supreme Court in debating the con-
sequences of reconsidering the state action limitation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
And just as the Court’s consideration of the state action doctrine revolved around not
only doctrinal complexities but also broader concerns about the relationship of the
Court to extrajudicial efforts at legal change, congressional consideration of the state
action doctrine moved back and forth between the technical legal issues at stake and
broader social and political concerns.  Doctrinal issues received considerable attention
from the legal experts involved with the drafting process.  Yet the outcome of the
debate over the constitutional basis of the federal public accommodations law ulti-
mately turned on concerns that had little to do with constitutional analysis of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Partisan politics and legislative strategy injected limita-
tions on congressional consideration of the merits of pressing for a new vision of the
coverage of the Equal Protection Clause.  Systemic and institutional factors also made
their presence felt.  Of particular concern to members of Congress as they debated
the constitutional basis for the public accommodations law was the role of Congress
in relation to the Court in matters of constitutional interpretation.
As this Part demonstrates, executive and legislative efforts to reconsider the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment were always constrained by the shadow of the Court’s
state action doctrine.  With the white South mobilized in resistance to Brown, and
the campaign of massive resistance calling into question not only the school desegre-
gation decision but the entire authority of the Supreme Court, civil rights supporters
found themselves defending not only the cause of civil rights but the principle of
judicial interpretive supremacy.  Southern resistance to Brown turned the finality of
the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution into a critical fault line for the civil rights
movement.  Therefore it was far from an auspicious time for bold proclamations of
legislative interpretive autonomy, even if expressed in support of the civil rights
cause.  Ironically, there was a supportive Supreme Court that was actually looking for
Congress to act on the public accommodations issue—and appeared willing to grant
considerable latitude, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, for Congress
to offer its own reading of the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A. The Supreme Court and Section 5
As described in Part II, throughout their deliberations in the sit-in cases the
Justices remained sharply divided on the basic state action question: whether, as a
self-enforcing right, to be recognized in the courts, the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tected against discrimination in privately-owned public accommodations.  Yet a
majority—perhaps even all—of the Justices expressed a willingness to recognize
congressional power to regulate public accommodations through Section 5 of the
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Fourteenth Amendment, the section that empowers Congress to enforce the provi-
sions of the amendment “by appropriate legislation.”219  The willingness of even those
Justices who would eventually come out strongly against a broad Section 5 power
(most notably, Justice John Marshall Harlan) to accept congressional interpretative
latitude over the contours of the state action doctrine has not yet been sufficiently
recognized in Warren Court scholarship.
For those Justices who concluded that proprietors of public accommodations
were state actors for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause,220 congressional enforce-
ment in this area was straightforward: there was no question that Congress, under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, had the power to enforce a judicially recog-
nized equal protection right.  But for those Justices who aligned themselves with
Justice Black and refused to extend the Fourteenth Amendment to cover public accom-
modations discrimination, the Section 5 question posed considerable difficulty.  As
a result, this group of Justices considered, apparently for the first time in a sustained
manner, a doctrinally transformative approach to congressional power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment: they began to make the case for the Court extending to
Congress some measure of interpretive latitude in defining state action under its
Section 5 enforcement powers.  In other words, even those who affirmed the prin-
ciple of state action as defined in the Civil Rights Cases challenged that decision’s
holding with regard to congressional power and public accommodations.  Among
themselves at least—for only hints of this would reach published Court opinions—
they recognized that a congressional definition of state action (under Section 5) might
go beyond a judicial definition (under Section 1).  The confrontation with state action
in the years between 1960 and 1964 revealed the Court’s first serious effort to come
to terms with the role of Congress in protecting civil rights in an era when most had
come to look to the Court as the primary actor in this field.
The idea of decoupling Section 1 and Section 5, while little theorized at this
point, was not without precedent.  The groundwork for such a broad understanding
of Section 5 powers had been laid out a decade earlier, in the context of school deseg-
regation.  During deliberations in Brown v. Board of Education, several Justices had
demonstrated a willingness (at times even an enthusiasm) to recognize congressional
Section 5 power to define the Fourteenth Amendment in ways that diverged from
existing Supreme Court precedent.  The pragmatic element here was obvious.  As
they struggled with the constitutionality of school segregation, the Justices clearly
would have preferred for Congress to demonstrate some initiative on the problem.
As Justice Jackson observed to the NAACP lawyers during oral arguments: “I suppose
that realistically the reason this case is here was that action couldn’t be obtained from
Congress.”221  Several Justices openly expressed a willingness to allow Congress to
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take the lead, through its Section 5 powers, in redefining equal protection to prohibit
segregated education.222  Of course, it was obvious to all involved that Congress was
not about to do so.  After all, recent sessions of Congress were not even able to pass
anti-lynching legislation because of the stranglehold Southern senators had over the
passage of any civil rights legislation.223  Yet the fact that Congress had the power to
desegregate schools under its Section 5 powers, even if the Court had not yet explicitly
overruled Plessy, seemed to be generally accepted, not only within the Court, but
among the leading legal scholars of the day.224  As the Justices on the Brown Court
recognized, a broad reading of the Section 5 power had a strong grounding in the
original intentions of the Fourteenth Amendment’s framers.225
In short, the under-examined assumption of the Brown Court was that there could
be an allowable gap between Section 5 and Section 1, which could have two possible
consequences for the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence.  Either the Court would
be willing to recognize and accept this gap, perhaps under a kind of “necessary and
proper” reading of Section 5.226  Or (more likely) the Court would follow Congress
in redefining the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause—that is, the congressional
interpretation of equal protection would then be adopted by the Court as a self-
enforcing constitutional right.227
After Brown came down, critics of the decision often pointed to Section 5 in
claiming that the issue should have been dealt with by Congress, not the Court.228
806 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:767
229 See, e.g., Charles Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term—Foreword: The Attack
on the Segregation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83, 85 (1956); Freund, supra note 224, at 351;
Willard Hurst, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 55, 60 (E. Cahn
ed., 1954).
230 IN CONFERENCE, supra note 138, at 712; see also id. at 720. At one point Black told
his colleagues that he would be willing to overrule the Civil Rights Cases—presumably refer-
ring to its Section 5 holding rather than its definition of the state action doctrine as applied
to judicially enforceable (i.e., Section 1) rights. Earl Warren, Conference Notes (undated) (on
file with Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Papers of Earl Warren, Box 510).
231 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 331, 343, 345 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); see also
id. at 326 (referring to Section 5 as an example of an “other section[ ]” that has scope beyond
Section 1).
232 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 204–05 (1970) (separate opinion of Harlan);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 669–70 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Defenders of Brown countered that while the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
assumed a more powerful role for Congress, historical experience had demonstrated
the need for judicial leadership on the protection of constitutional rights.229
The same assumptions toward Section 5 that emerged in Brown deliberations
reappeared in the early 1960s in the Court’s confrontation with public accommoda-
tions discrimination.  As with the school desegregation issue, the Justices would have
preferred congressional action on this contentious and constitutionally difficult issue.
Justice Black emerged as not only the staunchest defender of the state action doctrine
as a Section 1 question, but also the most outspoken proponent of the constitutional
validity of federal public accommodations legislation under Section 5.  In conference
discussion on the sit-in cases of the 1962 Term, he noted, “I would have no difficulty
in sustaining a state law or a federal law under the Fourteenth Amendment (despite
the Civil Rights Cases) that would prevent racial discrimination and require a retailer
to serve all people.”230  In his dissent in Bell v. Maryland, where he denounced the
tactics of the sit-in protesters and rejected their Fourteenth Amendment claim, he
repeatedly referenced congressional Section 5 power to prohibit discrimination in
public accommodations.231
Black’s Section 5 position appeared to have the support of other Justices who,
like Black, ultimately rejected the Fourteenth Amendment claim of the lunch counter
protesters.  The most surprising of these supporters was surely Justice John Marshall
Harlan.  Harlan would emerge in the following years as the staunchest critic of the
concept of decoupling Section 5 from Section 1.232  Yet, initially at least, he sug-
gested that he would, if necessary, consider upholding Title II under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Although in the sit-in cases he argued that Section 1 did not apply to
privately-owned public accommodations, there are indications that he did not see
this interpretation as necessarily limiting congressional power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  For example, Harlan was insistent that Black’s opinion in Bell make
no unnecessary reference to congressional authority—that it focus on defending the
traditional state action doctrine under Section 1, without addressing its possibilities
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under Section 5.233  And, later in 1964, when the Court reviewed the constitution-
ality of Title II, Harlan repeatedly emphasized that Congress had accepted a specifi-
cally judicial (i.e., Section 1) definition of state action, rather than attempting to
create its own definition—and it was for this reason that the proper basis for the law
was the commerce power and the Fourteenth Amendment question need not be
decided upon.234
Justice Douglas’s approach to Section 5 was shamelessly opportunistic.  He
adjusted his views of Section 5 according to the leverage it could bring for his pre-
ferred interpretation of Section 1.  When he sought to sway his brethren to his position
on the constitutional claim of the sit-in protesters, he emphasized the need to have
a tight linkage between Section 1 and Section 5.  He wrote in an October 21, 1963,
memorandum:
Apart from the Commerce Clause, Congress has no power to leg-
islate in this field if there is no state action in the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment . . . .  [I]f we hold that restaurants and
other businesses serving the public cannot discriminate against
people on account of race, Congress can ‘enforce’ that construction
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  But if we hold that this kind of dis-
crimination is beyond the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment
there is nothing for Congress to ‘enforce’ and the Civil Rights
Cases are vindicated.235
Later that term, however, when Justice Douglas recognized that he lacked the votes
for this Section 1 position, he took quite a different line, accepting the Section 1–
Section 5 decoupling he had recently rejected.  “Congress by reason of § 5 has some
leeway to define what due process requires in protection of federally protected rights.
Moreover, Congress has authority to define what is ‘state’ action within the meaning
of the Fourteenth Amendment in order to protect federal rights against dilution.”236
Justice Brennan also struggled with the relationship between the Court’s han-
dling of the sit-in cases and the constitutional basis for the public accommodations
legislation that Congress was considering.  In a note to Justice Douglas, Brennan
sought to make sense of the novel situation in which the Court found itself, with a
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Congress that appeared poised to press ahead of the Court on a major civil rights
issue.  His words captured the Supreme Court’s emerging Section 5 doctrine as it was
taking shape:
[I]s it ‘enforcing’ legislation if the Court holds that section 1 does
not protect the Negroes right to service but rather the owner’s right
to exclude them?  What then does Congress ‘enforce’?  [May]
Congress . . . under section 5 erase a right this Court holds is pro-
tected by section 1?  I ask, not because I am opposed to the result,
but because I don’t know.237
When the Justices discussed the sit-in cases in conference, Brennan again raised this
concern.238  In the coming years, Brennan would emerge as one of the leading articu-
lators of a broad Section 5 power.239
By the time members of Congress seriously started to consider the constitutional
basis for a federal public accommodations law, a Court sharply divided on the question
of state action under Section 1 appeared to be moving toward agreement on recog-
nizing some level of congressional latitude in defining state action under Section 5.
Thus, in framing Title II, congressional supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment
route had two possible paths.  One centered on Section 1: Congress could evaluate
the proper scope of the state action doctrine in applying the protections of the Equal
Protection Clause, focusing on judicial precedent, or perhaps hoping to persuade the
Court to reconsider its existing definition of Section 1 state action.240  The other cen-
tered on Section 5: Congress could recognize that congressional interpretation of state
action under its enforcement provision might vary in some way from judicial inter-
pretation of state action under Section 1.241  Drawing on the intentions of the framers
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and perhaps acknowledging the differing institutional
competencies of Congress and the courts, Congress might recognize a gap between
judicial and congressional constitutional interpretation of state action.
This second route, however, hardly had a presence in the legislative history of
Title II.  The discussion would center predominantly around precedent and prognos-
tication—what the Court had done and what the Court was likely to do in the near
future.  Ironically, at the very moment when the Court was willing to hand over inter-
pretive authority to Congress on this crucial question of the scope of the state action
doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment, most members of Congress were eager to
reassert the interpretive authority of the courts.  In part, this deferential attitude can
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be attributed to the fact that the Court’s evolving position on this question was
largely hidden from view, only to be partially revealed in the divided Bell opinion
(which was handed down well after the Commerce Clause rationale for Title II had
won the day in Congress).  But it also had to do with the specific political dynamics
surrounding the passage of the Civil Rights Act.  And, more generally, it reflected
challenges inherent in congressional constitutional interpretation.  The following two
sections explore these factors.
B. The Kennedy Administration and the Fourteenth Amendment
When the sit-ins first spread across the South in 1960, the possibility of a federal
public accommodations law was, in the words of one observer, “so remote that a
discussion of it [was] largely academic.”242  Not only was the constitutional foundation
for such a law unclear, but the very idea of a federal nondiscrimination requirement
in public accommodations was both highly controversial and, considering Southern
control of the Senate, unlikely to pass.  As late as February 1963, when President
Kennedy called on Congress to pass comprehensive civil rights legislation, he refer-
enced the need for federal intervention in the areas of voting rights and school deseg-
regation, but his discussion of the problem of public accommodations discrimination,
while describing the issue as one of constitutional dimension and of the highest moral
importance, failed to identify much of a federal role in the issue.243  After noting the
ongoing efforts against discrimination in interstate transportation and on federal prop-
erty, he concluded with a call for action by state and local government and private
initiative.244  It was not until the Birmingham campaign in the spring of 1963, when
dramatic protests and mass jailings attracted national headlines and dominated nightly
newscasts, that the Kennedy administration and Congress began to explore federal
law as the ultimate solution to the public accommodations dilemma.  “A new climate
of national opinion was created on the streets of Birmingham,” observed Alexander
Bickel.245  Ultimately, these pressures would help create the necessary national sup-
port that would result in the passage of the Civil Rights Act in the following year.
Yet in the late spring of 1963, when the administration first introduced a major public
accommodations bill, there was much urgency but not much optimism that the legis-
lation would make it through the Senate.246
Top administration officials were divided over whether to even include a public
accommodations provision when the Kennedy administration began drafting a new
civil rights bill in May and June of 1963.  Attorney General Robert Kennedy, along
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with Nicholas Katzenbach, the Deputy Attorney General, and Burke Marshall, the
Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, favored addressing the issue,
while several senior presidential aides opposed it as too risky.247  The escalating crisis
in Birmingham pressured the Kennedy administration to squarely address discrimi-
nation in public accommodations.  Once the administration committed itself to what
would become Title II, the debate turned to how to justify congressional power in
this area.
Between May 1963 and the middle of the following fall, the constitutional basis
for Title II was debated in Congress, the Justice Department, and the press.  This was
the critical period when the competing lines of arguments developed and, ultimately,
when the Commerce Clause argument emerged as the primary basis for the law.  By
the time the House brought the bill to the floor in early 1964, the public accommo-
dations bill was framed and generally understood to be based primarily on the com-
merce power, with the Section 5 power reserved as a secondary justification.248  When
the Senate debated the Civil Rights Act for eighty-one days in the spring of 1964,
there was little dispute over the constitutional foundation for Title II.249  The triumph
of the Commerce Clause rationale was the product of a concerted campaign, led by
constitutional lawyers in the Justice Department, academia and, eventually, by the
Attorney General, who came to embrace this rationale with particular energy.  They
were motivated by a variety of concerns–constitutional principles and a concern
with protecting the integrity of the federal judiciary, but also partisan politics and
legislative tactics.
Initially, two factors favored the Fourteenth Amendment approach.  First was
the common sense factor: the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to deal with the
legacy of slavery and racial inequality, the Commerce Clause was not.  Advocates
of Section 5 attacked the Commerce Clause rationale as involving something disingen-
uous, an avoidance of the basic issue—particularly when the Fourteenth Amendment
seemed the more appropriate basis for such a law.  As Senator John Sherman Cooper
told the Senate Commerce Committee: “If there is a right to the equal use of accom-
modations held out to the public, it is a right of citizenship and a constitutional right
under the 14th Amendment.  It has nothing to do with whether a business is in inter-
state commerce.”250  “If a Federal ban on such businesses as stores, restaurants [etc.] is
to be enacted, it should rest on the obviously most relevant source of national power,
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the 14th Amendment, rather than the tenuously related Commerce Clause,” asserted
Stanford Law professor Gerald Gunther in a letter to the Justice Department.251  “The
proposed end-run . . . not only reflects a questionable evaluation of the relative diffi-
culties presented by the two constitutional provisions; but also, and more importantly,
suggests an inclination toward disingenuousness, cynicism and trickery as to consti-
tutional principles [by the] Law Department of the United States.”252  Some in the
press agreed.  While the Commerce Clause may be appropriate for “a river and harbor
bill,” when “logrolling and adjustment,” were acceptable, the Washington Post lec-
tured, it was not appropriate when “basic human rights are at issue.”253  To many,
it simply made sense that such a foundational civil right would be handled under the
constitutional equal protection provision.  This was the provision on which school
desegregation was based, and most civil rights supporters saw desegregation in public
accommodations as a natural extension of the attack on segregated schools and other
public facilities, such as parks and beaches.
The second factor that had the potential to bolster the case for the Fourteenth
Amendment rationale was the partisan valence of the respective constitutional clauses.
Democrats tended to be more enthusiastic about the commerce power, which hark-
ened back to their party’s achievements in the New Deal.  The Kennedy administra-
tion pressed this rationale, in part, as a way to solidify support within its own party.254
In contrast, Republicans were often less enthusiastic about the expansive scope of
the modern commerce power.  They were more likely to look to the Fourteenth
Amendment, a legacy of the party of Lincoln.  Republicans “had always resisted the
broad application of the commerce clause to social and economic legislation,” noted
Joseph Rauh, vice-chairman of Americans for Democratic Action and a leading
lobbyist for the legislation, recalling the party’s constitutional resistance to FDR’s
New Deal legislation.255  Furthermore, they “looked back with pride to the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment by a Republican Congress.”256  It was this Republican
identification with the Fourteenth Amendment that, in part, motivated the adminis-
tration, early in the debate over the framing of Title II, to emphasize both constitu-
tional bases for the law as a way to attract both Democratic and Republican support.257
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During the early stages of the framing of Title II, it appeared that these factors
would ensure the prominence of the Fourteenth Amendment basis.  Both President
Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy initially assumed that the public accommo-
dations law would be grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment.258  Yet after a brief
initial period of political assessment and legal research, administration support soon
shifted toward the commerce power.  The administration never abandoned Section 5
but, by the fall of 1963, it clearly regarded it as a secondary constitutional basis for
congressional action.
The growing reliance on the Commerce Clause was the product of a number of
factors.  For one, the most basic pragmatic considerations of legislative strategy played
a role.  The Senate Commerce Committee was a far friendlier place in which to dis-
cuss the proposed legislation than the Senate Judiciary Committee, which was chaired
by arch-segregationist James Eastland of Mississippi and was known as the “graveyard
of civil rights legislation.”259  Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington, a supporter
of the civil rights bill, chaired the predominantly liberal Commerce Committee.260  (In
the House there was no such concern: the House Judiciary Committee was chaired
by Emanuel Celler, a strong civil rights proponent).261  So framing the legislation as
a regulation of interstate commerce justified sending it directly to the Commerce
Committee, thereby avoiding Eastland’s committee.
But these legislative obstacles had a limited effect on the ultimate outcome of the
constitutional debate.  The gradual but steady undermining of the Kennedy brothers’
initial assumption that the law would derive from the Fourteenth Amendment started
with discussions with legal experts in the Justice Department and in academia.  Burke
Marshall, in a May 20, 1963, memorandum outlining the upcoming legislative battle
over federal civil rights legislation and urging reliance on the Commerce Clause,
emphasized that the Civil Rights Cases were still good law and predicted that the
Supreme Court was going to reject the raising of the Fourteenth Amendment claim
in the pending sit-in cases.262  Solicitor General Cox had been struggling with the
state action doctrine in his arguments before the Supreme Court in the sit-in cases,
attempting to balance the administration’s official posture of opposition to racially
discriminatory practices with his instinctively cautious approach to the development
of constitutional doctrine.263  As the administration’s public accommodations law
took shape, Cox urged deference to existing Court doctrine.  He feared that pushing
the Court to expand the state action doctrine was unwise as constitutional doctrine and
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that it would threaten the legitimacy of the federal judiciary.264  As he recalled, “here
my philosophy about the role of judges and the prestige of the Court, the legitimacy
of the Court’s decisions, did play an important part.”265  Cox, a specialist in labor law,
was confident that the commerce power was fully adequate for the new law.266  He
could easily make this case before the Court, and he was confident they would have
no trouble upholding such a law on Commerce Clause grounds.267
The administration’s position was also strongly influenced by the recommenda-
tions of Harvard Law School professor Paul A. Freund, a regular legal adviser to the
Kennedy administration.  Freund’s crucial contribution was to frame the Commerce
Clause approach as more limited than the Fourteenth Amendment approach.  “[A]ny
decision overruling the Civil Rights Cases has implications for judicial power and
duty that transcend the immediate controversy,” he warned in a brief submitted to the
Senate Commerce Committee, expressing a concern for protecting the Court similar to
Cox’s.268  The Commerce Clause “is primarily a grant of legislative power to Congress,
which can be exercised in large or small measure, flexibly, pragmatically, tentatively,
progressively, while guaranteed rights, if they are declared to be conferred by the
Constitution, are not to be granted or withheld in fragments.”269  Freund’s critical
assumption here was that the coverage of Section 1 and Section 5 was coterminous:
“[I]t is necessary to arrive at some conception of the range of rights which an overruling
of the Civil Rights Cases would create for the courts and the Congress to enforce.”270
But later in his brief Freund referenced the idea of decoupling congressional power
under Section 5 from the judicial definition of the substantive right in Section 1.  He
suggested that Section 5 might be treated in a way analogous to the Commerce Clause:
as a general grant of legislative power, the scope of which would be largely defined
by the policy evaluation of the Congress, taking heed of both constitutional principle
and the pragmatic application of federal policy.271
If the Court is to be persuaded to overrule the Civil Rights Cases,
the most effective approach would be to emphasize the power con-
ferred by section 5 of the amendment on Congress, and to draw
as wide a gap as possible between this and the self-executing,
judicially enforced prohibitions of section 1.272
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Yet this approach also posed potential risks for the Court, Freund warned.  For pur-
suing this path would make “the responsibility on Congress . . . all the greater to think
through the implications of its action for constitutional claims that are not precisely
those recognized in the bill but in principle may be comparable.”273  Freund’s ten-
tative suggestion on this point was never picked up by the bill’s Justice Department
advocates.  But his larger argument—that the Commerce Clause was not only the
stronger foundation for Title II, but also the more desirable for its pragmatic and
readily delineated qualities—was.
These influential opinions helped move Attorney General Kennedy to become
a powerful advocate in the congressional debates for basing Title II predominantly
on the Commerce Clause.  But his acceptance of the Commerce Clause rationale
stemmed more from pragmatic concerns than constitutional analysis.  Upon intro-
duction of the bill, the official administration position was that both the Fourteenth
Amendment and commerce power would be relied upon.  President Kennedy, in his
June 19 message to Congress calling for passage of the sweeping civil rights bill,
highlighted both constitutional bases for Title II.274  The Attorney General made the
same point in his presentations to congressional committees.275  As the Title II debate
evolved, Robert Kennedy would continue to assert his personal opinion the Section 5
basis was sufficient, and would be upheld in the Supreme Court, yet he would increas-
ingly emphasize that the administration stood squarely behind the Commerce Clause
and that Section 5 was best treated as a secondary justification.276  He repeatedly
asserted not only that the Supreme Court would have little trouble approving of the
constitutionality of Title II under the Commerce Clause.277  Furthermore, picking up
Freund’s critical contribution to the discussion, he argued that the Commerce Clause
framework added desirable constraint on to the scope of the law.278  In his appeal to
moderates in Congress, Kennedy emphasized this limiting argument as a major sell-
ing point for the Commerce Clause.279  In the end, the Kennedy administration’s con-
stitutional arguments, shaped by the Attorney General’s strategic concerns, proved
persuasive in Congress.
C. The Fourteenth Amendment in Congress
The most committed proponents of resting Title II squarely on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s enforcement power came from an eclectic group of strong civil rights
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liberals in Congress.  On May 8, prior to the administration drafting its own bill,
House Judiciary chairman Emanuel Celler, Democrat from New York and an early
proponent of civil rights legislation, started hearings on public accommodations legis-
lation, with discussion focused primarily on congressional power under Section 5.280
On May 23, 1963, the day after President Kennedy announced at a news conference
that he was considering broader civil rights legislation,281 Senators John Sherman
Cooper, Republican from Kentucky, and Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat from Connecticut,
introduced legislation that would rely on Section 5 rather than the commerce power
and would have broad application, covering all businesses that operated under state or
local licensing.282  Then, in early June, John Lindsay, a leader of civil rights supporters
among Republican House members, introduced a civil rights bill that included a public
accommodations provision based on the Fourteenth Amendment.283  Lindsay and other
liberal Republican supporters of civil rights reform argued that the appropriate basis
for the law was the Fourteenth Amendment.284  They also argued, in a direct reversal
of the argument Freund would press on the Justice Department, that resting a public
accommodations law on Section 5 offered more limited coverage for the law than a
Commerce Clause justification.285
The debate between the dueling rationales for Title II came to a head in the fall
of 1963, when liberal House members sought to expand Title II’s coverage under a
Section 5 rationale.  In September 1963, in the midst of the outcry over the Birmingham
church bombing that killed four African American children, Robert W. Kastenmeier,
a Democratic congressman from Wisconsin, proposed a bold extension of Title II.286
His version drew on Section 5 to cover not only public accommodations but also
private schools, law firms, and medical associations, with the requisite state action
located in the licensing of these businesses.287  In the process of defending his pro-
posal, Kastenmeier denounced the strategic nature of the administration’s bill, which
prohibited discrimination in restaurants and hotels while allowing it in “barber shops,
beauty parlors, many other places of recreation and participation sports, unless such
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places serve food.”288  Kastenmeier’s bill posed a serious threat to the administration’s
effort to carefully orchestrate the drafting of the civil rights legislation.  Celler sup-
ported it, believing that bringing a stronger bill out of committee would create a better
bargaining position, and the inevitable compromises that would be needed to pass
the bill would still result in a strong civil rights law.289
Fearing such an expansion would sink the bill, the administration launched a
counter-campaign, the centerpiece of which was the case for the Commerce Clause
as the basis for Title II, particularly what they argued would be the limiting effect this
approach would have on the bill’s coverage.  In October 1963, Robert Kennedy again
testified before the House Judiciary Committee and then gave a press conference
where he criticized efforts to expand Title II’s coverage.290  The proposed expansion
would bring under the ambit of the law “all kinds of businesses . . . private hospitals,
and private schools, and every kind of business conceivable, lawyers, doctors, and
everything.  I think that is dangerous.”291  He then made the connection between this
complication and the constitutional basis for the law—a connection that would become
the centerpiece of the administration’s position.
If a private businessman has a company and he has some em-
ployees, and you pass Title II, and he wants to fire some of his
employees, under the Fourteenth Amendment he has been an
instrument of the State, as this was passed, and he has been made
an instrument of the State, and is the employee entitled to due
process?  What if he promotes somebody?  Does he have the
right to due process?  What if the religious school wants to read
the Bible?  The Bible cases were brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Does he have power and authority and the right to
do all of that?292
Burke Marshall then added that the reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment “is not
simply an expansion of” the administration proposal, but “an entirely new concept
of the Constitutional reach of the Department of Justice in Federal powers.”293  At this
point Kennedy declared: “It is more power than I want, and more power than anybody
should have, in my judgment, under our system of government.”294
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Following the press conference, the Attorney General wrote a memorandum
to the President in which he suggested that the sweeping coverage pressed by the
Fourteenth Amendment advocates “is probably unconstitutional and in any event brings
under federal control for some purposes such business establishments as lawyers’
offices, doctors’ offices, and other licensed establishments.  It should be deleted.”295
Title II, he emphasized, should focus on hotels, theaters, places of amusement, places
that serve food, and gas stations.296  Reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment was appro-
priate only where there was unquestionable state action, such as in application to places
in which state law required segregation.297  The Attorney General had strategically
abandoned the faith he had displayed earlier toward the Fourteenth Amendment
(and toward the Supreme Court’s willingness to accept this approach).  His letter to
the President showed him revising his constitutional interpretation to align with his
legislative strategy.
The administration was successful in its campaign to fight the expanded version
of Title II by highlighting the limiting role of the Commerce Clause.  Robert Kennedy
and the Justice Department worked with Celler and William McCulloch, the senior
Republican on the House Judiciary Committee, to find an acceptable middle ground—
one that would address the reservations of congressional moderates while maintaining
the protections necessary for effective civil rights reform.  The Commerce Clause
rationale for Title II, framed by the administration as the less far-reaching approach,
became a central tool for attracting these moderates.  The alternative Section 5-based
bill was soon abandoned, and by the end of 1963, supporters of the bill set their stock
predominantly on the Commerce Clause rationale,298 with Section 5 remaining to
cover any facilities affected by official state segregation policy and also as a secondary
rationale for other public accommodations.299
By the opening of 1964, with the constitutional basis of Title II largely settled, the
debate turned toward getting the bill through Congress.  The House passed the omni-
bus civil rights bill, including Title II, on February 10, 1964, in a vote of 290–130.300
After a lengthy filibuster, the Senate did the same on June 19, in a vote of 73-27.301
With President Johnson’s signature, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law on
July 2.302
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305 Id. at 250.
306 Brief for Appellees at 15, Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241(No. 515).
307 Id. But see also id. at 16 n.11 (“We also wish to point out that in stressing the commerce
power in the instant brief—a power which we believe to be clearly and completely dispositive
of the case—we imply no suggestion that the Act may not be sustained as an exercise of the
power conferred by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
308 Transcript of Oral Argument, Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. 241 (No. 515), reprinted in
60 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 552 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter
Heart of Atlanta Oral Argument].
D. Title II in the Supreme Court
The constitutionality of Title II was immediately challenged, and before the year
ended, the Supreme Court upheld it as a legitimate exercise of the commerce power.303
The Court reserved the question, however, of the validity of Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a basis for the law.  While recognizing that the legislative history drew
on both rationales,304 the Court found it unnecessary to evaluate the Section 5 claim.
“This is not to say that the remaining authority upon which it acted was not adequate,
a question upon which we do not pass, but merely that since the commerce power is
sufficient for our decision here we have considered it alone.”305
One factor discouraging a square ruling on Section 5 was the forceful arguments
of Solicitor General Cox, who, in defending the constitutionality of Title II before the
Court, urged the Justices to ignore the Fourteenth Amendment.306  In his brief Cox
wrote:
[T]he government has proceeded throughout this litigation upon
the theory that the constitutionality of Title II, as applied to
appellant, may be sustained under the commerce clause without
reference to the additional power conferred by Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  We stake our case here upon the same
theory.  The decision in the Civil Rights Cases . . . is therefore
irrelevant.307
When discussion turned to Section 5 during oral arguments, an exasperated Justice
Harlan interjected: “[I]t is perfectly clear that the Government . . . is arguing only that
the Act is constitutional and is arguing the constitutional commerce clause power.
That’s all we’ve got.  This other argument may be interesting, but it isn’t germane to
this lawsuit.”308  In oral arguments Cox reiterated the government’s intention to rest
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exclusively on the commerce power that he had outlined in his brief.309  The problem
of public accommodations discrimination is “a commercial problem of grave national
significance,” he told the Court.310  Even when Justice Goldberg suggested that it was
also a moral problem, Cox continued to present the law as concerned primarily with
the effects on interstate commerce that resulted from public accommodations discrim-
ination and the resulting protests.311  When Goldberg asked whether the Justices could
still consider the Section 5 basis for the law, Cox allowed that they could but reiterated
that this path was unnecessary.312
Cox’s case proved persuasive with the Justices.  “We should not concern our-
selves with the Fourteenth Amendment,” Warren stated in the Justices’ conference.313
Black told his colleagues, “I would prefer to go on the Fourteenth Amendment, but I
think that Congress limited the act to the commerce clause.  Otherwise, I would be for
overruling the Civil Rights Cases.”314  Most surprisingly, considering his later attacks
on his colleagues’ efforts to recognize a Section 5 power than went beyond Section 1
limitations defined by the Court, Harlan rejected the Fourteenth Amendment basis for
Title II, but did so in a way that distinguished between the congressional adoption
of the Court’s state action standard and a congressional effort to define the standard
for itself.  Harlan told the Justices in conference discussions on Heart of Atlanta and
McClung that Congress did not take upon itself an independent definition of state
action; rather, “Congress, by use of ‘state action,’ has adopted the Civil Rights Cases
and has used it in the judicial sense of the term.”315  It was, Harlan argued, because
the legislation accepted the traditional state action definition that the Fourteenth
Amendment alone was not a sufficient basis for Title II.316  Here Harlan was elabo-
rating on a point he made during oral arguments, when he noted:
[T]he Civil War amendments . . . provided that the Federal power
to deal with local state action with reference to discrimination is
limited to discrimination that is applied to state action; and, for
whatever it is worth, Congress in this bill seems to have accepted
that view of the Civil Rights Cases in the judicial construction
that is put on state action by the courts.317
These comments suggested the possibility that Congress held some interpretive
authority under Section 5, but that it had not chosen to exercise it in passing Title II.
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322 Id. at 278–79 (Black, J., concurring). In subsequent cases Black reiterated his belief
in judicial deference to congressional authority to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments.
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Brennan agreed, noting in conference discussion that in Congress “the ‘state action’
definition followed the Civil Rights Cases, and that these cases must go on the
commerce clause.”318
Only Douglas and Goldberg insisted that the Section 5 issue needed to be faced.
“The legislative history shows confusion on the Fourteenth Amendment issue,”
Goldberg noted.319  “It utilized §5 as they thought §5 might be read, no matter how
broadly.”320  In other words, Goldberg seemed to understand Congress as having re-
lied on the Court’s definition of state action, rather than making its own definition.
Justices Douglas and Goldberg found authority for the new law in both the Commerce
Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.321  In his Heart of Atlanta con-
currence, Black emphasized that his Bell dissent did not pass judgment on the scope
of Section 5 power, and that he agreed with the opinion of the Court that this question
should not be faced in these cases.322
E. Legislative Constitutionalism in the Shadow of the Supreme Court
In some ways, the historical context surrounding the framing of Title II seemed
particularly auspicious for a strong assertion of congressional interpretive authority
on the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Especially relevant was the Court’s
eagerness for the legislative branch to share responsibility in dealing with public
accommodations discrimination; most, perhaps all, of the Justices were willing to
recognize congressional interpretive latitude under Section 5 on the state action ques-
tion.323  Yet even under these circumstances, the Title II debate in Congress never
escaped the shadow of judicial doctrine.  Even the boldest assertions of the role of
Congress in helping to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment were
framed as more of a petition to the Court than a constitutional interpretation with
independent validity.324
2010] THE SIT-INS AND THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 821
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 57–65 (1999). For alternative accounts
that see the Title II debate as an example of relatively independent legislative constitution-
alism, see MORGAN, supra note 25, at 324–30; Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by
Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707, 744 (1985); Goldstein, supra note 26; see also
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (2003) (describing civil rights legislation
of the 1960s as establishing “the possibility of a lively and consequential dialogue between
the Court’s legal interpretation of the Constitution and the constitutional ideals democratically
embraced by the nation”).
325 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 261; see also 2 STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: CIVIL RIGHTS 1121, 1129, 1304 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1970) [hereinafter
STATUTORY HISTORY]; Post & Siegel, supra note 26, at 492 n.241.
326 See, for example, Senator Goldwater’s June 18, 1964 statement opposing the Civil Rights
Act. He opened: “There have been few, if any, occasions when the searching of my conscience
and the re-examination of my views of our constitutional system have played a greater part
in the determination of my vote than they have on this occasion.” He went on to warn of the
dangers of a Congress that “ignore[s] the Constitution and the fundamental concepts of our
governmental system” and to attack Titles II and VII of the bill, in general terms, as going
beyond congressional regulatory power and infringing on powers reserved to the states. Text
of Goldwater Speech on Rights, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1964, at 18; see also
MORGAN, supra note 25, at 326–27.
The inability of Congress to put forth a stronger claim under Section 5 for inter-
pretative authority of the Constitution has several explanations.  First, this was a
difficult time for any challenge to judicial interpretive supremacy on behalf of civil
rights.  The Title II debate took place in the shadow not only of judicial doctrine but
of massive resistance.  For this reason it is perhaps not surprising that the strongest
claims for independent interpretive authority came from segregationist and conserva-
tive opponents of the legislation.  Those who stood opposed to the law recognized they
were fighting an unpopular and likely losing battle.  On the basic policy question—
the need for an antidiscrimination policy in public accommodations—they had pretty
much lost the fight before debate began.  The sit-ins, although controversial as a tactic
for reform, represented a cause that by the early 1960s was widely recognized as just.
Thus, opponents put their hopes in the Constitution.  They made pleas for Congress
to embrace its responsibility as guardians of the federal system and reject Title II be-
cause it violated constitutional principles of states’ rights.  They put a good deal of
energy in the long-shot argument that Title II violated some constitutional liberty pro-
tection of property owners.  These arguments faired somewhat better in the halls of
Congress, where they were at least given ample airtime, than in the courts, where they
were summarily dismissed.325  Because they were such a stretch from a doctrinal per-
spective, they necessitated a posture of interpretive independence from the courts in
making them.  The few times in which members of Congress spoke of constitutional
text and principles without direct reference to Supreme Court doctrine were in these
passionate, if tendentious, arguments that a federal requirement of nondiscriminatory
access to stores, restaurants, and hotels violated basic principles of federalism or
individual property and privacy rights.326
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Yet more often than not, segregationists joined their opponents in resting their
constitutional arguments on the authority of the Supreme Court.  This was particu-
larly ironic, considering the segregationists’ defiant attitude toward the Court in an era
of massive resistance.  Although the Court had proved itself anything but a friend of
the segregationist South in recent years, some saw promise in the Court’s unwilling-
ness to take on the constitutional issue at the heart of the sit-in cases.327  Simply being
able to cite the long-lasting precedent of the Civil Rights Cases gave some legitimacy
to their failing claims.  Thus, the debate over the constitutional foundation of Title II
was remarkably free of challenges to judicial authority,328 even by those who in re-
cent years had enthusiastically denounced the Court as being under control of radicals
and Communists.
To counter this argument that the Civil Rights Cases still controlled, supporters
of the civil rights bill were not about to challenge the authority of the Court.  In an
era of massive resistance to school desegregation, the Southern Manifesto, and the
Supreme Court’s sweeping declaration of interpretive supremacy over the Constitution
in Cooper v. Aaron (1958),329 the authority of the Court was all but synonymous with
the cause of racial justice.330  Rather than directly challenging the validity of the Civil
Rights Cases or the state action doctrine, Title II supporters had two possible paths.
They could argue that the Court—and the nation—had changed significantly since the
nineteenth century so that the Court was likely to reconsider its holding in the Civil
Rights Cases.331  For example, Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois, framed his support
for the legislation in the following terms: “We are not overruling the Court.  We are
giving the Court the opportunity to reverse itself in accordance with changing views
of the very meaning of the 14th amendment and of the commerce clause.”332  Or they
could take the other path, which by the fall of 1963 had become the default option:
look to the Commerce Clause as the basis for the public accommodations bill.333
In the debate over Title II, it proved a rare moment when a member of Congress
claimed to be acting on a direct relationship with the Constitution, as opposed to
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viewing it predominantly through the lens of Supreme Court doctrine.  In the end,
Congress, in adopting a general attitude of deference to judicial interpretative finality,
passed up an opportunity to directly assert a Section 5 power that a majority of the
Court seemed willing to grant.  Congress denied itself an opportunity to join rather
than follow the Supreme Court in the project of interpreting the Constitution.
CONCLUSION
The survival of the state action doctrine, in roughly its traditional form, had
relatively little direct consequences for the fates of the sit-in protesters or their demand
for racially nondiscriminatory access to public accommodations.  Although the con-
stitutional challenge to the state action doctrine failed, the sit-ins, on the terms that
were most important to the protesters themselves, were a stunning success.  Indeed,
the essential resolution of the public accommodations issue must be judged as one of
the greatest achievements of the civil rights movement.  What was one of the most
controversial civil rights issues of the day became, by the end of the 1960s, a broadly
accepted norm of conduct for the nation.  The readiness with which Title II, the most
contentious part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 at the time of its passage, was imple-
mented surprised many.334  Title II became, in remarkably short order, an accepted part
of federal civil rights law, with nothing like the ongoing debates that have marked
struggles to desegregate education or rid the workplace of racial discrimination.
Ultimately, the federal government responded to the problem of private racial
discrimination primarily through various statutory remedies, with the Fourteenth
Amendment playing only a supporting role.  In addition to Title II, Congress passed
major civil rights legislation targeted at discrimination in employment (Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964),335 and housing (Civil Rights Act of 1968).336  Begin-
ning in 1968, the Supreme Court revitalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as the basis
for a sweeping federal remedy against discrimination in making contracts and trans-
ferring property in the private sphere.  The Court held that the modern descendants
of the 1866 Act—42 U.S.C. §1981 and §1982—drew in part on the authority of the
enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment, which has no state action require-
ment.337  As a result of the civil rights movement, protection against overt racial
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discrimination in certain spheres of private life has come to be recognized as a basic
right of American citizenship, and federal civil rights law has reflected this new
social norm.
With Congress accepting responsibility to protect individuals against certain
forms of private discrimination, the dynamic of discussion on the state action doctrine
shifted.  If not for federal legislative action, it is hard to imagine the Supreme Court
continuing to refuse to use the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for challenging
segregated restaurants and hotels.  Whether such a holding would have been used as
an opportunity for a fundamental reconsideration of the state action doctrine is another
issue.  As it was, after the sit-in cases and Title II had been played out, the Court had
additional opportunities to revisit the state action requirement in the context of pri-
vate racial discrimination, yet the majority of the Court continued to accept the basic
functioning of the state action doctrine.338  For most constitutional claims where state
involvement is non-obvious, the decision to identify or not to identify state action
continues to function as the critical threshold question.
The resilience of state action during the civil rights era highlights a contradiction
at the heart of the doctrine when considered as a socio-legal phenomenon.  Since
judicial conceptions of state action have historically tracked shifting extrajudicial norms
of social justice and government responsibility, the very concept is unsustainable with-
out baseline assumptions about the proper role of government in regulating private
action.339  When a nominally private action becomes so offensive to prevailing con-
ceptions of right and wrong, the courts are more likely to identify some form of state
responsibility or involvement in that private action.  Yet the evolving social norms
behind the shifting limits of state action have another consequence, which can work
to remove pressure on the courts to expand state action.  Legislatures also respond to
the emergence of a new social consensus.  In the 1960s the Court’s confrontation with
state action took place in parallel with a dramatic expansion of public accommodation
legislation, on the local, state, and federal levels.  These developments ultimately re-
lieved demands on the Court to respond through revisiting the limits of state action.
The expansion of state action is therefore often in a race of sorts with the spread of
statutory remedies—a race the courts have generally been happy to concede.340
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But here is the tension at the heart of the state action doctrine.  Definitions of
state action depend on basic assumptions about government responsibility—about,
in essence, the expected, normal functioning of government.  A critical point at which
this can be measured is the existence of positive law relating to the issue.  Thus, the
prevalence of public accommodations law is a central way in which a court can assert
that government has or should have a general responsibility to protect against discrim-
ination in public accommodations.341  But at the same time, public accommodations
laws offer the courts a reason to avoid the difficult state action issue.  Hence the
ultimate non-resolution of the constitutional claim of the sit-in protesters.  The most
dramatic shifts in state action doctrine occur when social norms shift without con-
current shifts in statutory remedies.342  Between 1960 and 1963 it appeared a similar
dynamic would result in another, perhaps more fundamental, shift in state action doc-
trine.  This Article has sought to explain the reasons this did not come to pass.
Despite the achievements of the sit-ins and the civil rights movement in creating
new expectations of government responsibility to protect against private discrimination,
the resilience of the state action doctrine has had more readily identified consequences
in terms of constitutional law.  Many in the early 1960s considered the sit-ins a funda-
mental challenge to existing constitutional interpretation.  The sit-ins presented the
“most crucial” legal issue since Brown, one law professor argued, the resolution of
which “may have more far-reaching implications and greater consequences than even
the School Segregation Cases.”343  Justice Goldberg, in a private conference of the
Justices in late 1963, declared the sit-in cases presented “the most serious problem
before the Court in recent years.”344  “No question preoccupies the country more than
this one,” Justice William O. Douglas wrote in Bell.345  The problem of state action,
Charles Black wrote in 1967, “is the most important problem in American law.  We
cannot think about it too much; we ought to talk about it until we settle on a view both
conceptually and functionally right.”346
Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has ever offered much to clarify what
Professor Black labeled the “conceptual disaster area”347 of state action doctrine.  If
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anything, the challenges of the civil rights era only brought to the foreground the basic
instability of the idea of state action and the stark public-private divide upon which
it relies.  Yet intense interest in the subject would sharply decline in the decades fol-
lowing the 1960s,348 as both Congress and the Court turned to other legal bases for the
most ambitious forays into the sphere of private discriminatory conduct.  Today most
scholars agree that the state action doctrine hardly constitutes the proudest pages of the
American constitutional tradition.349  Although constitutional law is filled with anach-
ronisms and conceptually confused doctrines, state action stands out.  The history of
the sit-in cases and the Title II debate help explain why this is so.  When the Court and
Congress had the opportunity to reconsider the state action doctrine, to make it more
responsive to the demands of the civil rights era, neither institution was willing to do
so.  As a result, one of the most important questions of American constitutionalism—
namely, how far constitutionally protected rights reach into American society—is still
inextricably tied to the Civil Rights Cases of 1883, a Supreme Court decision from
an era in which the Court and most of American society had fundamentally different
views about questions of federalism and civil rights.350  In turning to the commerce
power as the primary basis for Title II, Congress passed up an opportunity to more
directly align the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment with the rapidly developing
nondiscrimination norm within the private economic sphere.  And the Warren Court’s
inability to reconsider the state action doctrine in the light of the social, cultural, and
political transformations of the civil rights movement must be seen as one of the most
surprising developments in an era marked by such whole-scale legal transformation
in the name of racial equality.
Perhaps the most lasting constitutional legacy of the history of the sit-ins and state
action derives from the Title II story.  With regard to federal public accommodations
law, the triumph of the commerce power rationale over the equal protection rationale
had little significance.  It is unlikely that a Section 5 approach would have resulted in
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a stronger law coming out of Congress,351 and the Supreme Court upheld the law under
an extremely broad reading of the commerce power.352  As a matter of Section 5 juris-
prudence, however, the consequences of the commerce power triumph have assumed
renewed importance in recent years.
The favoring of the Commerce Clause over the Section 5 rationale in Congress—
a choice the Court essentially ratified in its decisions upholding Title II—proved only
a temporary setback for the principle that Congress had some level of independent inter-
pretive authority under Section 5.  Chief Justice Warren wrote in a decision rejecting
a challenge to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, with regard to the enforcement clause of
the Fifteenth Amendment (containing language identical to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment), that “[t]he basic test to be applied in a case involving § 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment is the same as in all cases concerning the express powers of Congress
with relation to the reserved powers of the States,”353 i.e., the same deferential review
used in commerce power cases.  In Katzenbach v. Morgan,354 the Court recognized
an allowable gap between a judicially enforceable (“self-executing”) Fourteenth
Amendment right and an allowable congressional remedy under Section 5.355  For
a time, it appeared as if the Court had accepted the path, suggested but not followed
in the public accommodations controversy, of allowing Congress some latitude in
defining the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.356
Unlike the avoided Section 5 basis for Title II, however, Morgan was an ambig-
uous concession from a divided Court on a relatively minor piece of legislation.357
The Court never expanded upon its implications and recently has been intent on limit-
ing it.  Just four years after Morgan, the Court held in a sharply divided opinion that
Congress exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment when it sought to
lower the voting age in state elections.358  In the following decades, the Morgan model
of Section 5 had an uneasy existence, seemingly inviting limited congressional lati-
tude in determining the proper methods of enforcing Fourteenth Amendment rights.359
More recently, in City of Boerne v. Flores,360 the Court has sought to protect its
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interpretive authority over the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that any effort at
congressional enforcement under Section 5 be “congruent and proportional” to the
Court’s definition of the constitutional right.361
It is worth considering the alternative path for Section 5 doctrine that might have
emerged if Congress had squarely placed Title II under the Fourteenth Amendment
and if the Court had upheld it on these grounds.362  In Morgan the Section 5 issue had
to do with the allowable gap between a judicially defined constitutional right (the right
to vote) and congressionally defined remedies to protect this right.  In contrast, to have
upheld Title II on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, the Court would have to accept
that Congress had Section 5 authority to expand the scope of the right itself, by alter-
ing the boundaries of the state action limitation on the Equal Protection Clause.  Such
a ruling would have required a rationale that would have been different from the right-
remedy discussion that emerged out of Morgan, which the Court used as the basis for
limiting Congress’s Section 5 discretion in Boerne.363
***
If there ever was an opportunity to fundamentally reshape the state action doctrine,
it came in the federal government’s confrontation with public accommodations dis-
crimination in the years following the sit-in movement.  The doctrinal groundwork
was in place, the underlying cause at issue supported in national opinion.  Many
assumed at the time that resolution of the issue demanded a reconsideration of the
state action doctrine.  Yet, when given the opportunity, neither the Supreme Court
nor Congress took this path.
At the heart of the story of the sit-ins and the state action doctrine are a series
of ironies: the very tactic of civil disobedience that contributed to the sit-in protests’
achievements as a social and cultural challenge limited their success in the Supreme
Court; and the bold responsibility the Court adopted for protecting civil rights in Brown
actually hindered congressional efforts at constitutional interpretation in the Title II
debate.  As a matter of popular constitutional understanding, the sit-ins were transfor-
mative.  As a matter of Fourteenth Amendment doctrine, they proved a dead end.  This
disconnect between extrajudicial and judicial understandings of the Constitution—
between constitutional culture and constitutional law—should complicate our under-
standing of the ways in which popular and legislative constitutionalism work in prac-
tice.  An appreciation of extrajudicial constitutionalism is necessary, Robert Post
explains, “because the legitimacy of constitutional law depends in part upon what
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extrajudicial actors explicitly believe about the Constitution.”364  Social movements
that contribute to a shift in constitutional culture exert pressure on official interpreta-
tions of the Constitution, often resulting in new doctrine;365 in general, this was the
dynamic of the civil rights movement.  But as this Article explains, certain forms of
extrajudicial constitutional pressure, no matter how powerful in the realm of consti-
tutional culture, may be limited in moving the courts.  At times, they may even have
the unintended consequence of threatening the dialogue between the Court and the
nation that is the lifeblood of a robust constitutional tradition.  An effective act of civil
disobedience has the unique potential of sowing the seeds of a constitutional contro-
versy, driving a wedge between a society that is moved by the sincerity and moral
force of the protest to reconsider basic constitutional principles and a judiciary whose
recognition of this claim is obscured by a hesitancy to legitimate a challenge to the
judicial process and the rule of law.  The persuasive force of the constitutional claim
raised by the sit-ins demonstrates the power of social protest movement pressures to
instigate a penetrating national dialogue on the meaning of the Constitution, even as
the resilience of the state action doctrine shows the challenges of making this dialogue
an effective tool of official constitutional re-interpretation.
